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THE FORGOTTEN FEW: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM AND ITS IMPACT ON 
MINORITY AND FEMALE CANDIDATES 
JASON P. CONTI* 
Abstract: Campaign finance reform attracts intense political, academic, 
and media attention. The debate swirling around the McCain-Feingold 
legislation in 2001 is evidence of the power of the issue. Despite the 
intensity of the spotlight, commentators and politicians often overlook 
an important element of any proposed reform: diversity. This Note 
explores campaign finance reform from an under-explored angle: the 
impact proposed reforms would have on minority and female 
candidates. This Note explores the woefully inadequate diversity of 
representation in elective office and critiques numerous proposals for 
change from the perspective of a prospective minority or female 
candidate. This Note concludes that in order for the diversity of those 
holding elective office to better reflect the diversity of the nation as a 
whole, reformers must take the concerns of minority and female 
candidates into account and must institute publicly funded campaigns. 
The two most impartant things in politics are money and I can't remember 
what the other one is. 
-Mark HannaI 
During every election cycle, politicians, incumbents and chal-
lengers trumpet the need for campaign finance reform.2 However, 
once the election cycle has ended and a large percentage of the poli-
ticians already in the House of Representatives and the Senate return 
to those bodies, the issue seems to face stiff opposition and insur-
mountable odds.3 Certainly, reform does not fail to occur because of a 
* Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2001-2002). 
1 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 How. LJ. 5, 11 (1999) (Samantha San-
chez, co-director of the National Institute on Money in State Politics, quoting former sena-
tor Mark Hanna (R-Ohio). 
2 Rachel Van Dongen & Amy Keller, Democratic Candidates Try to Rally Around Campaign 
Finance Reform, Pol~ters Wonder Whether Issue Will Matter to Voters, ROLL CALL (D.C.), Aug. 10, 
1998 (explaining that several Democratic candidates were trying to use campaign finance 
reform to their advantage in the 1998 mid-term election). 
S Tim Curran, Campaign Finance Reform Bill Besieged By Four Separate Democratic Factions, 
ROLL CALL (D.C.), May 17, 1993; Martin Van Der Werf, U.S. Senate Struggles with Campaign 
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lack of bills; in each Congress, a significant number of proposals are 
introduced presumably to bring about meaningful reform.4 Despite 
seemingly good intentions, with the exception of the campaign 
finance bill that passed the Senate in April 2001, campaign finance 
legislation usually does not leave its assigned committee, and the legis-
lation that does manage a full vote in the House or Senate usually fails 
to gain a m..yority.5 
While there is no shortage of campaign finance reform legisla-
tion, the real problems with campaign finance laws, for the most part, 
are not being addressed within the blizzard of proposed legislation.6 
Reformers hope to achieve several different intended goals when 
proposing a change, including controlling campaign costs and con-
trolling where campaign money originates.7 However, the main goal 
of any real campaign finance reform must be to increase the competi-
tiveness of congressional elections by attempting to level the playing 
field between incumbents and challengers.s 
While increasing parity between challengers and incumbents is 
an often-touted idea from reformers, particularly academics as op-
Finance Reform; Complex Plan to Set Spending Limits Spurs Bickering Between Democrats, GOp, 
ARIz. REpuBLIc,june 14, 1993, at AI. Then Representative and current Republican U.S. 
Senator from Arizona jon Kyle has said "This [the most recent campaign finance bill] 
proves there is nothing more difficult to get bipartisan consensus on than campaign-
finance reform." See id.; PHILIP D. DUNCAN & CHRISTINE C. LAWRENCE, CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY'S POLITICS IN AMERICA 1998, THE 105TH CONGRESS 44 (1997) (listing jon Kyle 
as the junior senator from Arizona) . 
4 See S. 719, 107th Congo (2001); S. 176, 107th Congo (2001); S. 27, 107th Congo 
(2001); S. 22, 107th Congo (2001); S. 17, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 1637, 107th Congo 
(2001); H.R. 380, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 151, 107th Congo (2001); S. 2941, 106th Congo 
(2000); H.R. 2866, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 3068, 105th Congo (1997); Proposals at a 
Glance, ROLL CALL (D.C.), May 28, 1998 (detailing numerous bills in the 105th Congress 
that deal with campaign finance reform). 
5 SeeS. 27, 107th Congo (2001) (sponsored by Senators john McCain, R-Ariz., and Rus-
sell Feingold, D-Wis.); KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, THE ESSENTIALS OF AMERI-
CAN GOVERNMENT, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 375 (3d ed. 1998); Alison Mitchell, Cam-
paign Finance Bill Passes in Senate, 59-41; House Foes Vow a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at 
Al [hereinafter Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate]. Even the McCain-Feingold legisla-
tion passed in the Senate faced an uncertain future given the trouble the House version 
encountered. See infra note 331. O'Connor and Sabato explain that although campaign 
finance reform is a ''favorite Washington topic ... little legislation is ever passed." See 
O'CONNOR & SABATO, supra, at 375; Mike Doming, Campaign Reform Dead Again; GOP Sena-
tors Defeat Bid to Ban 'Soft Money' Donations, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1999, at 1. 
6 See KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ROOTS AND RE-
FORM 461 (2d ed. 1996). 
7 PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN 
WASHINGTON 244-45 (1995). 
8 See id. at 244. 
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posed to entrenched incumbents, most reformers often overlook a 
significant factor: the effect of any proposed reform on minority and 
female candidates.9 Because of the dearth of minority and female 
politicians in Congress and in gubernatorial mansions across the 
country, minority and female candidates tend to start from the infe-
rior challenger position,1O In addition to facing systemic dilemmas 
encountered by most challengers, minority and female candidates 
come to electoral contests with a host of unique disadvantages and 
concerns.ll It has long been known that the percentage of minorities 
and women in Congress is disproportionately low compared to the 
overall population; linking the problem to money, however, is a recent 
and under-explored area,12 
Part I of this article examines the dismally low representation of 
women and minorities in elective office, focusing on Congress be-
cause of its position as a feeder for higher office (i.e. the presidency). 
Part II details the monetary problems of all challengers and highlights 
the specific struggles faced by minority and female candidates. In ad-
9 See id.; Spencer A Overton, But Some Are More Equal: IWce, Exclusion, and Campai[ff! Fi-
nance, TEX. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) [hereinafter 
But Some Are More Equal]. Overton explains that, ·'Reformers' class-based critique of the 
current campaign finance system is inadequate because race operates as a distinct political 
identity worthy of independent analysis in the campaign finance context." [d. at 7. This 
article, while relevant to all people of color, focuses more on black candidates and politi-
cians because there is limited information pertaining to other groups. See generally infra. 
10 See BARBARA C. BURRELL, A WOMAN'S PLACE Is IN THE HOUSE, CAMPAIGNING FOR 
CONGRESS IN THE FEMINIST ERA 106 (1994); JOHN THEILMANN & AI.. WILHITE, DISCRIMI-
NATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 153 (1991). 
11 LINDA L. FOWLER, CANDIDATES, CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 125 
(1993). While the problems of minority and female candidates are not exactly the same, 
nor are the circumstances of individual candidates within these groups, minority and fe-
male candidates in general share similar ideological leanings and a disproportionately low 
number within Congress. [d.; BURRELL, supra note 10, at 135; Terry Smith, Reinventing 
Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruc-
tion, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 280-81 (1998). Fowler notes that, "In studies ofroll 
call voting ... female lawmakers are consistently more liberal than their male colleagues, 
even when party affiliation is controlled. . . . Similar patterns are evident among Mrican-
American legislators, who have constituted the most liberal and cohesive voting block in 
the Congress." FOWLER, supra, at 125. Fowler explains that the sample of Hispanic and 
Asian legislators is too low to come to any reliable conclusions. [d. Also, Fowler points out 
that "women and ethnic minorities often bring different occupational backgrounds to 
Congress ... life experiences [that] probably contribute to the differing agendas that 
women and ethnic minorities pursue in Congress .... " [d. at 125-26; THEILMANN & WIL-
HITE, supra note 10, at 156-57. 
12 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 57. The authors note that, "Numerous 
works investigate the impact of money on congressional campaigns, but only a handful ... 
examine the impact of campaign funding on the election of blacks and women." [d. 
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dition, Part III details several of the most popular campaign finance 
proposals, explaining how each proposal, if implemented, would im-
pact minority and female candidates. Part N focuses on the positive 
campaign finance reform experiment in Maine, a full public funding 
scheme, and also explores the force of politics in limiting reform. Fi-
nally, Part V of the article details the best and worst reform proposals 
with regard to female and minority candidates, and stresses the need 
for reformers to take the interests of minority and female candidates 
into account when devising any possible campaign finance reform. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL COMPOSITION: THE MELTING POT 
SKIPPED CONGRESS 
A. Minority Congressional Composition 
The 2000 election included a record number of black candidates 
for federal office on major party tickets, a total of seventy candidates, 
an increase from fifty-seven in 1998}3 Despite the increase in candi-
dates, however, the thirty-nine black members elected in 2000 to the 
107th Congress equals the number of black members in the 106th 
Congress.14 Even worse, the only non-incumbent black candidate for a 
federal office who won in 2000 was William Clay, Jr. from Missouri, 
who won his House seat from his retiring father.15 Of the thirty-three 
black challenger or open-seat candidates in 2000, thirty-two of them 
lost-everyone except Clay.16 
13 David Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, A Preliminary Analysis, Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies, 3 (2000), at http://wwwJointcenter.org/selpaper/blackvote 2000. 
htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter The Black Vote in 2000]; David Bositis, The Black 
Vote in '98, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 3 (1998), at http://www.joint-
center.org/ selpaper /black.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002). In 1996, there were fifty-eight 
black candidates for federal office, and in 1994 there were sixty-six, the highest total before 
the 2000 election. Bositis, The Black Vote in '98, supra, at 3. 
14 Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3. The number thirty-nine represents 
thirty-seven voting members and two non-voting delegates. Id. Non-voting delegates cannot 
cast votes on the House floor, but these representatives from Puerto Rico, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands enjoy most of the member privi-
leges including office space, staffs, and the ability to vote in committee. ROGER H. DAVID-
SON & WALTER]. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 27 (5th ed. 1996). 
15 Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3. 
16 Id. Challengers are candidates who take on incumbents, and open-seat candidates 
are candidates that run for an office that does not have an incumbent seeking reelection. 
SeeHERRNsoN, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
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The Senate will again be without a single black member among 
its ranks,17 In addition, in the last six election cycles (every two years 
from 1990 through 2000), a span that has seen each of the 100 Senate 
seats come up for election twice (a total of 200 races) there have only 
been a total of ten black major-party nominees, representing less than 
3% of the overall tota1.18 In the 107th Congress, with 535 voting 
members in the House and Senate and five non-voting delegates, 
blacks comprise thirty-seven voting members, and two delegates, or 
7.2%.19 The 2000 census revealed that blacks comprise 12.1 % of the 
nation's population, unchanged from the 1990 census.20 
On the state level, eleven major-party black candidates sought 
statewide elective office in 2000, down from twenty-five in 1998.21 Of 
the eleven candidates, four were winners.22 The four black victors in-
cluded a public service commissioner in Georgia, a North Carolina 
Court of Appeals justice, North Carolina's state auditor and the Texas 
railroad commissioner. 23 
The dismal representation level of Hispanics has become that 
much more apparent since the release of the minority percentage 
breakdown from the 2000 census.24 The Hispanic population grew by 
17 See Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3. The mayor of New Orleans, 
Marc H. Morial, noted that, "'Certainly, I'd be interested in [being a statewide candidate] 
. .. at some point. But in Louisiana they haven't elected a statewide African-American 
official since the 1880s.'" Kevin Sack, Pressed Against a '&ce Ceiling: N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2001, at A12. 
18 See Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 8. The 200 races with 400 candi-
date slots include incumbents, so there have not been 400 different candidates. See id. 
19 See id. at 3. In the thirty-two districts in the nation that have the highest percentage 
of blacks, twenty-nine are represented by black representatives. See John Mercurio, House 
GOP Back to 6-Seat Majority, ROLL CALL (D.C.),June 21, 2001. 
20 Smith, supra note 11, at 279; Eric Schmitt, For 7 Million People in Census, One Race 
Category Isn't Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al [hereinafter For 7 MiUion People in 
Census]. 
21 Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3. Since passage of the Voting Rights 
Act, only one black candidate has been elected governor of a state, L. Douglas Wilder in 
Virginia. See Sack, supra note 17, atAl2. At least one candidate for governor in 2002 will be 
black: H. Carl McCall, the New York state comptroller, plans to run for governor in New 
York. See id. 
22 Id. The four winners included a Georgia Public Service Commissioner, a North 
Carolina Court of Appeals justice, a North Carolina State Auditor, and a Texas Railroad 
Commissioner. Id. 
2! Id. 
24 See Schmitt, For 7 Million People in Census, supra note 20, at AI. The term Hispanic, as 
defined by the United States Census Bureau, includes Hispanics or Latinos of any race, 
including general categories labeled Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other Hispanic 
or Latino. See Summary File 1; 2000 Census of Population and Housing, United States Census 
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about 58% compared to the 1990 census and for the first time has 
surpassed blacks as the largest minority group.25 Hispanics went from 
comprising 9.3% of the population to comprising 12.5% following the 
2000 census.26 Despite the rise, there are only twenty-one Hispanic 
representatives in the House, about 4.8% ofthe total.27 
B. Women in Congress: A Slow Climb 
In the 2000 election, the ranks of women in Congress swelled to a 
record number.28 Following the 2000 election, the Senate includes 
thirteen women, which is an increase of four women over the last 
Congress.29 Every woman who received a major party nomination for 
the Senate in the year 2000 won in the general election.30 In addition, 
the House has a record number of women serving in the 107th Con-
gress, swelling to sixty women as well as two non-voting delegates.31 
The fifty-four incumbent female representatives are joined by eight 
new women in the House; five female candidates won open-seat elec-
tions in 2000, two beat incumbents in 2000, and one won a special 
election in June 2001.32 The sixty-two members in the House (sixty 
Bureau, app. B-3 at 517, at http://www.census.gov I prodl cen20001 docl sfl.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2002). 
25 See Schmitt, For 7 Million People in Census, supra note 20, at AI. 
26 Id. 
27 See Eric Schmitt, New Census Shows Hispanics Are Even with Blacks in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2001, at Al [hereinafter New Census Shows]. 
28 Election 2000: Summary of Results for Women, Center for American Women and Politics 
(CAWP), Eagleton Institute of Politics-Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, (2000), 
at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/ -cawp/factsl elections/Summary2000.html (last visited Jan. 
22,2002). 
29 See id. The new members of the Senate include Maria Cantwell, D-Wash.,Jean Car-
nahan, D-Mo., Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y, and Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich. Id. Three 
incumbent female senators were reelected in the year 2000: Dianne Feinstein, D-Cal., Kay 
Bailey Hutchinson, R-Tex., and Olympia Snowe, R-Me. Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. This number includes Rep. Diane Watson, D-Cal., who won a special election on 
June 5 replacing a male representative, Julian C. Dixon, who died. B. Drummond AyresJr., 
Democrat Easily Wins California Seat in House, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at Al4. Despite re-
cent gains, six states have never sent a woman to Congress: Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire and Vermont. Ben White, Politics; Women Are Still Underrepresented, 
Study Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,2000, atAl5. 
32 Ayres, supra note 31, at A14; Election 2000, supra note 28. All female incumbents who 
ran for re-election won. Election 2000, supra note 28. One of the two female candidates who 
managed to beat an incumbent, Democrat Jane Harman in California, had been a con-
gresswoman from the district until 1998 when she gave up her seat to run for governor of 
California, lost in the gubernatorial Democratic primary, and then reclaimed her seat in 
2000. The Pacific, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at A40. 
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voting members and two delegates) as well as the thirteen senators is 
roughly 13.9% of the total 535 voting members and five non-voting 
members of Congress.33 Every census since 1950 has shown that 
women outnumber men, and the 2000 census was no different; 
women make up 50.9% of the nation's population.34 
In the states, a record number of women are serving as gover-
nors.35 The five female governors following the 2000 election in-
cluded two incumbents who did not face an election, one incumbent 
who won re-election, and two newcomers.36 In addition, women also 
serve in a number of other statewide elective offices.37 Despite other 
gains, however, the number of women in state legislatures after the 
2000 election dropped slightly from 22.5% to 22.3%.38 
33 See ElRction 2000, supra note 28. One of the sixty-two female members in the House 
was recently elevated to the highest position a woman has held in either House of Con-
gress in U.S. history. See Adam Clymer, A New Vote Counter; Nancy Patricia Pelosi, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, at A18. Pelosi's, D-Cal., Democratic colleagues elected her to the number two 
spot, House Democratic Whip, second only to House Minority Leader Richard A 
Gephardt, D-Mo. Id. 
34 Mary Beth Schneider, Women Still Hold Majority, but Not Their Share of Power; FemalRs 
Are Not Common in Leadership Positions Despite a Half-Century of Change, INDIANAPOUS STAR, 
May 27, 2001, at AI. This represents a slight drop from the 1990 census, when women 
comprised 51.3% of the general population. Id. 
35 See ElRction 2000, supra note 28. 
36 Id.Jeanne Shaheen in New Hampshire won re-election, and Ruth Ann Miller (D) in 
Delaware andJudy Martz (R) in Montana won for the first time. Id.Jane Dee Hull (R) of 
Arizona and Christine Todd Whitman (R) of New Jersey did not face an election. Id. 
Whitman left her gubernatorial post before her term ended, however, to serve as head of 
the Environmental Protection Agency in the Bush administration. David M. Halbfinger, 
DiFrancesco Sworn In as Acting Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at B5; Glen Johnson, A 
Divided Panel Backs Ashcroft, Key opponents of Bush Choice Hoping for 40 Votes Tomorrow, Bos-
TON GLOBE,Jan. 31, 2001, at AI. With Whitman's departure, Senate President Donald T. 
DiFrancesco (R) became the acting governor of New Jersey, reducing the female guberna-
torial total to four. Halbfinger, supra, at B5. However, the number returned to five when 
Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Jane M. Swift (R) became the first female governor in 
the state's history when she was sworn in as acting governor to replace Governor Paul Cel-
lucci (R), who left to be the U.S. ambassador to Canada. Frank Phillips, Transfer of Power; 
'Her Excell1incy' Swift Is First Woman to Serve as Mass. Governor, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11,2001, 
at AI. 
37 ElRction 2000, supra note 28. Following the 2000 election, CAWP listed eighty-four 
statewide elected officials including sixteen lieutenant governors, eight attorney generals, 
thirteen secretaries of state, eleven state treasurers and a host of other positions. Id. 
3B Id. Of 2229 female candidates for state legislatures in 2000, preliminary results 
showed that 1388 won, which added to the 269 already elected female state legislators, 
bringing the number to 1656 women, or 22.3% of the total. Id. The ten state legislatures 
that have the highest percentage of female representatives range from Connecticut's 
28.9% to tlle highest percentage of 39.5% in Washington state. Id. The ten states with the 
lowest percentage of women in state legislatures range from 15.7% in Virginia, down to 
the 50th state for female legislators, Alabama, with 7.9% of the total. Id. 
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C. Congressional Diversity: A Limited History 
The under-representation of minorities and women in Congress 
has improved but not at a precipitous rate.39 As Fordham University 
School of Law Professor Terry Smith points out, in the 208-year his-
tory of the Senate, there have been only four black senators, five 
Asian senators, and only three senators who appear to have Hispanic 
surnames.4O Smith paints a somewhat rosier picture of the historical 
composition of the House, noting that the percentages of minorities 
in the House has risen since redistricting following the 1990 census.41 
However, despite the rise, as of 1996, fewer than 100 blacks had 
served in the House and Senate combined throughout the nation's 
history.42 Women have enjoyed a slow yet steady climb in the number 
of female office-holders, increasing in the House from 2.5% of the 
total in 1967, to about 14% of the House following the 2000 elec-
59 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 135; Smith, supra note 11, at 280-81. 
40 See Smith, supra note 11, at 281. The four black senators in the nation's history in-
clude two from Reconstruction, Hiram Rhodes Revels, R-Miss., and Blanche Kelso Bruce, 
R-Miss., and only two from this century, Edward William Brooke (R) who served in the late 
1960s and throughout the 1970s from Massachusetts, and Carol Moseley-Braun (D), 
elected in 1992 from Illinois, and defeated by a white, male Republican in 1998. Id.; Cam-
paignFinance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 1, at 18. 
41 Smith, supra note 11, at 281. Prior to redistricting in 1990, blacks made up only 
4.9% of Congress and Hispanics made up 2.5% (compared to voting age populations of 
11.1 % and 7.3% respectively). Id. Following the redistricting effort to make more majority-
black and majority-Hispanic districts, numbers jumped to 8% black, 4% Hispanic, 1 % 
Asian and .2% Native American. Id. However, current numbers show that since the post-
1990 spike in percentage, the number of black representatives in the 107th Congress has 
actually fallen to 7.2%. See Bositis, The Black Thte in 2000, supra note 13, at 3. 
4!1 DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 14, at 125. The authors note that no blacks served 
in Congress from 1900 through 1928, and in the next twenty-five years only three blacks 
were elected. Id. Even in modern races involving minorities, some commentators blame 
race as the deciding factor. See Mercurio, supra note 19. AJune 19, 2001 special election in 
Vrrginia pitted two state senators against one another: a white Republican, Randy Forbes, 
and a black, female Democrat, Louise Lucas. Id. Forbes won 52% to 48%, prompting some 
to suggest the "defeat resulted from lingering racism in a state that has only elected one 
black House Member ... since Reconstruction." Id. Mercurio quotes Rep. Maxine Waters, 
D-Cal., as saying, "'Clearly the difference here was race .... [S]he had all the 
qualifications. She fit that district, except for race.'" Id. 
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tion.43 However, as of 1996, less than 200 women had been elected or 
appointed to Congress.44 
Despite the noted gains in the percentages of minorities and 
women in Congress, the percentage of each in relation to the overall 
population is still grossly disproportionate.45 Minorities and women in 
Congress are so rare in fact, that this year a Pennsylvania congress-
women challenged a black female representative's right to travel on a 
"members only" elevator not realizing that she was a member of Con-
gress.46 In order to raise the percentages, minority and women candi-
dates will either have to wait for more open seats to become available, 
which does not occur at a precipitous rate, or beat incumbents.47 
II. MONEY GETS IN THE WAY 
A. Financial Problems Faced lTy Challenger Candidates 
The problems faced by challengers, regardless of race or gender, 
is no secret in politics.48 David E. Price (D), a congressman from 
North Carolina first elected in 1986, has said that he knew when he 
4lI BURRELL, supra note 10, at 8. The author includes a chart detailing the percentage 
and number of women in the House, rising from 2.5%, or eleven members in 1967, to 
forty-5eVen members, 10.8% in 1993, the last year listed. Id. The percentage following the 
2000 election is calculated similar to Burrell's numbers which do not include non-voting 
members. Id. In the 107th Congress, there are sixty female voting members of the House 
out of 435 members. See Ayres, supra note 31, at A14; Election 2000, supra note 28. 
44 See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 14, at 125. The authors note that as of 1996, 
"somewhat more than 150 women have been elected or appointed to Congress." Id. The 
rise of women in Congress began with Jeannette Rankin (R), first elected from Montana in 
1916.Id. 
4lI See supra Section I. 
46 See Schneider, supra note 34, at AI. The black congresswoman Rep. Julia Carson, D-
Ind., said that Rep. Melissa Hart's, R-Pa., comments "'really didn't impact me that much; 
it's not my first time at the rodeo.'" Id. 
47 DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 14, at 64--65. The authors include a table showing 
the number of incumbents seeking reelection every two years for the last fifty years. Id. 
The fifty-year average is that 397 members of the House seek reelection and 29.1 members 
of the Senate do so (out of the roughly one-third up for reelection every two years). Id. 
These numbers equate to approximately 91 % of incumbents in the House and approxi-
mately 87% of incumbents in the Senate who seek reelection. See id. With only 9% of the 
House seats and 13% of the Senate seats opening up in any given election cycle, it would 
take a long time to reach parity with regard to minorities and women by just relying on 
seats opening up as opposed to challenging incumbents who do seek reelection. See id. 
48 DAVID E. PRICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, A VIEW FROM THE HILL 28 
(1992). Price, a white male who first ran for his House seat as a challenger, writes about his 
experiences running for and holding office, detailing the problems with raising money. See 
id. at 26-28. 
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decided to run that the odds of beating an incumbent were long at 
best: In each election from 1966 through 1984 (except for one), gen-
eral election success rates for House incumbents were 92% or 
higher.49 
While there are numerous reasons for incumbent success,50 cer-
tainly the financial advantage ranks among the most prominent.51 
Price recalls how difficult it was to raise initial dollars to run for office, 
a process that made him understand why many qualified candidates 
simply will not jump through the political hoops necessary for suc-
cess.52 Fundraising is so important that the only way challenger candi-
dates can overcome the advantages of incumbency is to amass a gigan-
tic war chest to support their effort. 53 In order to amass the necessary 
funds, challengers face the equally unenviable prospects of either 
gathering large sums of money from individual donors and/or dip-
ping into their personal funds. 54 In short, the most effective steps to-
wards attempting to unseat an incumbent involve elements that the 
average challenger cannot or will not do. 55 
49 See id. at 10-11. Price said a number of contributing factors, including the district's 
volatility and the incumbent's narrow win the election before, led to his decision to run. 
Id. at 11. O'Connor and Sabato explain that high reelection rates are the norm, ranging 
well above 90% in most election years in the House. O'CONNOR & SABATO (3rd ed.), supra 
note 5, at 360-61. However, the authors note that there is more chance for turnover in the 
Senate for various reasons, with incumbent reelection rates going as low as 60% in 1980. 
Id. at 361. However, the 1994 election, which has been regarded as a landslide because 
Republicans won enough seats to take back the Senate and the House, still saw a reelection 
rate for incumbent representatives and senators of90%. Id. 
50 O'CONNOR & SABATO (2d ed.), supra note 6, at 419. The reasons for incumbent suc-
cess include a high name recognition because they are already in office, additional access 
to the media because of the nature of their position, which lends itself to many high-
profile events, and the fact that "every year the average member of the u.S. House of Rep-
resentatives expends about $750,000 in taxpayer funds to run the office. Much of this 
money directly or indirectly promotes the legislator by means of mass mailing or constitu-
ency services." Id. 
51 PRICE, supra note 48, at 28. Price notes that, "There are many reasons for the advan-
tages congressional incumbents enjoy, but the status quo orientation of political finance 
surely ranks high on the list." Id. 
52Id. at 27. 
55 Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 
1390,1402 (1994). 
54 See PRICE, supra note 48, at 14; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1402. Price says that dur-
ing his first campaign for Congress in which he was a challenger, in order to raise the 
needed cash, "we did what we had said we would never do-we took out a $45,000 second 
mortgage on our home." PRICE, supra note 48, at 14. 
55 HERRNSON, supra note 7, at 142. The author explains that the best process to follow 
to amass the necessary funds starts with challengers donating or loaning the initial funds 
needed. Id. The challengers will then ask relatives, friends, colleagues, local activists, and 
anyone else they can think of to donate funds to their campaign. Id. Only after there has 
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Even if challenger candidates do amass the needed amounts of 
cash to mount a serious challenge, these candidates still do not per-
form as well as one might think.56 Studies have shown that throughout 
the years, there is a "reasonably strong and positive relationship be-
tween the amount of money spent by challengers and the share of the 
vote they received. "57 One study conducted by Professor Gary W. 
Copeland has shown that the expected vote totals for challengers is, 
in the words of the author, "truly depressing."58 Copeland's study 
shows that the average House challenger in 1998 spent about 
$300,000, and the predicted vote total at that level of spending was 
only 39.1 %.59 In terms of predictive vote total based on spending, a 
House challenger who spent $1,000,000 received 43.1 %; a challenger 
who spent $2,000,000 received 45.4%, which is "within striking dis-
tance."60 In order for the predicted vote total to have been more than 
50%, a House challenger would have had to spend $8,000,000.61 The 
findings confirm what has for a long time been intuitively known in 
politics: "Few challengers have the capacity to spend the amount of 
money necessary to beat an incumbent. "62 
B. The Never-Ending Struggle: Minority Candidates and Campaign Cash 
Minority candidates, specifically challenger minority candidates, 
raise much less money than white candidates, ultimately leading to 
less success on election day.63 Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, in a Yale 
Law and Policy Review article, note that while the creation of majority-
minority districts in which black or Hispanics comprise more than 
been some success at home do these challengers then attempt to collect money from 
Washington, D.C. sources. Id. Initially, at least, it helps a serious challenger to have either 
personal funds or a very large, somewhat well-off base of support. See id. 
56 PRICE, supra note 48, at 28. Table 2.1 shows congressional challengers funding levels 
and outcomes from 1984 through 1990. Id. Well-funded challengers, those with over 
$300,000, numbered 180 during the four elections; only ninety-six (slightly over 50%) 
polled at least 45% in the general election. Id. And of the well-funded challengers, only 
thirty-five (or slightly over 19%) won their race. Id. In the four elections, only seven chal-
lengers who raised under $300,000 won. Id. 
57 See Gary W. Copeland, The Impact of Money on Congressional Elections, 19 (presented at 
the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug./Sept. 2000) 
(on file with author). 
58 See id. at 20. 
59Id. 
60 !d. at 20, Table 3. 
61Id. 
62 Copeland, supra note 57, at 20. 
63 Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & 
POL'y REv. 273, 279 n.26 (1993). 
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50% of the population has increased black and Hispanic representa-
tion in Congress, it seems likely that private financing of political 
campaigns "now systematically favors white candidates and white in-
terests over minorities" in statewide races and races in majority-white 
districts.64 
In 1994, both Ron Sims (D), a county official in Seattle, and Alan 
Wheat (D), a congressman from a Kansas City district that was 75% 
white, ran for the Senate as viable black candidates.65 While Sims ran 
in Washington against an incumbent, and Wheat ran for an open seat 
in Missouri, both candidates fell far behind their opponents in the 
fundraising race.66 Despite running viable campaigns, both candidates 
lost to white candidates by sizable margins.67 In addition, a fierce 2000 
congressional race in Kentucky involved a white incumbent, Anne 
Northup (R), outspending her black opponent, Democratic Repre-
sentative Eleanor Jordan, by a margin of almost two to one.68 In that 
race, described as a bell-weather because both candidates were in-
64 Id. 
65 KennethJ. Cooper, More Blacks Run for Statewide Offices; 13 Candidates-a &cord-Of 
ten Find &ce Less Crucial Than Money to Staying Competitive, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1994, at 
A12. 
66 Id. 
67 DUNCAN & LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 818, 1518. In Missouri, John Ashcroft, former 
governor, beat Wheat by a margin of 60% to 36%, in a race in which, "Wheat's effort in the 
primary depleted his finances, and he showed little strength among the rural whites criti-
cal to the party's statewide majorities." Id. at 818. In addition, during the campaign, some 
accused Ashcroft of highlighting Wheat's race. Cooper, supra note 65, at A12. Cooper 
notes that E. Terrence Jones, a political scientist at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, 
"suggested that Ashcroft has tapped into a 'subtle racism' because 'each of Ashcroft's ads 
has had a picture of Alan [Wheat] in it, not too flattering, and clearly indicating his race,'" 
a charge Ashcroft denied. Id. In Washington, incumbent Senator Slade Gorton (R) beat 
Sims 56% to 44%, "a virtual landslide for the man who was defeated for re-election in 1986 
only to narrowly win the state's other Senate seat two years later." DUNCAN & LAWRENCE, 
supra note 3, at 1517-18. In addition, Carol Moseley-Braun, a black Senator from Illinois, 
lost her reelection bid in 1998 to Peter Fitzgerald who spent $18 million from his own 
pocket. Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 1, at 18-19. William McNary, co-
director of Citizen Action/Illinois, notes that Fitzgerald "refused to campaign in African-
American districts or Mrican-American areas" and characterizes Moseley-Braun, who 
raised $14 million, as unable "to raise enough money to defend herself." Id. 
68 Mary Leonard, Campaign 2000/Congress; Women Candidates Fierce, Financed, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2000, at A37. Leonard notes that Northup, collected almost $3 million for 
the campaign, while Jordan, raised more than $1.6 million. Id. Northup wound up winning 
the election by a comfortable margin, 53% to 44%. Al Cross, Election 2000; Kentucky; lTd 
Congressional District; In Big-Money &ce, Rep. Northup Wins Big, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louis-
ville), Nov. 8, 2000, at 5X. 
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tense competitors, Jordan accused Northup of "using subtle racial 
slurs to malign her. "69 
While each race comes with its own dynamics and it is difficult to 
generalize why black candidates do not do as well as white candidates, 
some have noted that a large contributing factor is the small amount 
of money blacks are willing or able to donate to campaigns.70 Many 
studies have shown that black candidates have a harder time raising 
funds than white candidates.71 One of the first major and often-cited 
studies of campaign funds and minority candidates comes from John 
Theilmann and AI Wilhite in their book Discrimination and Congres-
sional Campaign Contributions.72 The authors note that aggregate cam-
paign contributions to black candidates in general, when adjusted for 
various variables, on average resulted in a shortfall that ranged from 
$7000 to $30,000, meaning, "Apparently, being a black candidate in 
1988 reduced a candidate's campaign contributions by nearly 
$30,000. "73 As for individual contributions, Theilmann and Wilhite 
also note that black candidates face significant obstacles in cobbling 
together campaign donations.74 The authors' research led them to 
two conclusions: First, individuals "appear to discriminate against 
black candidates," and second, black candidates are more dependent 
on smaller contributions, which means higher costs trying to recruit 
additional small donations. 75 
Theilmann and Wilhite's findings have been expanded upon in 
studies that continue to show that minority candidates have a more 
difficult time raising money to run for office. 76 The results of the 1994 
elections show a sobering picture for minority candidates: The aver-
age winning white candidate for the House during the 1994 election 
69 See Leonard, supra note 68, at M7. Jordan noted that she was pictured as an "angry 
black woman" in many of Northup's advertisements. [d. 
70 Cooper, supra note 65, at A12. Cooper quotes Michael Brown, political director of 
AMERICA's Fund, a group that supports minority candidates, as saying, 'Traditionally, we 
people of color have not written the kind of checks other people do." [d. 
71 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 76-77; Eileen Shanahan, Taking Stock; 
Women Elected to the House in '94 Beat Out the Men as Fundraisers, CHI. ThIB., Aug. 20,1995, at 
9; Ed Vogel, Report slwws minority campaigns lack finances, LAs VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Sept. 
24, 1998, at 3B. See generally The Color of Money, Public Campaign, (1999), at http://www. 
publiccampaign.org/colorofmoney/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter The Color of 
Money]. 
72 See generally THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10. 
73 [d. at 76-77. 
74 [d. at 145-46. 
75 [d. at 146. 
76 See Vogel, supra note 71, at 3B. See generally The Color of Money, supra note 71. 
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received $562,000, while the average successful black and Hispanic 
candidates raised less than two-thirds of that figure. 77 
In addition, Public Campaign, a non-profit, non-partisan group 
dedicated to campaign finance reform, conducted a study entitled The 
Color of Money that examined the sources of individual campaign con-
tributions with respect to race during the 1996 federal election.78 The 
organization used zip code data from federal campaign reports and 
information from the U.S. Census to show that areas with the highest 
percentages of blacks do not give at the same rates as localities where 
whites comprise the majority.79 Public Campaign notes that because 
people of color tend to have "less wealth and lower incomes than 
whites in general," it is to be expected that their giving levels are also 
lower.8o While much of Public Campaign's findings tend to pit figures 
from the highest giving areas against figures from areas with a major-
ity of people of color (not exactly a fair comparison), the numbers 
still show a disturbing disparity.81 
Finally, a survey of donors who gave over $200 to the 1996 con-
gressional campaign showed that less than one percent identified 
themselves as people of color.82 In general, all the evidence seems to 
point to one conclusion: Candidates of color raise less money.83 Given 
that the top-spending candidate in the 1998 House elections won 95% 
of the time, candidates with an inherent disadvantage in raising cam-
paign cash will have a much more difficult time winning elections.84 
77 Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. 
78 See generally The Color of Money, supra note 71. 
79 Id. at 1 (Executive Summary). There are 2500 zip codes with over 50% people of 
color totaling about 41 million people. Id. In those areas, eight out of 10,000 people gave 
over $200, compared to the twenty-six top-giving zip codes in which more than four in 100 
gave a contribution, and the national participation rate which is about two per 1000, or 
twenty per 10,000. Id. 
80 See id. at 1 (Intro.). 
81 Id. at 1-2 (Intro.). Some of Public Campaign's findings include: The twenty-six zip 
codes that gave the most money to candidates, parties, and PACs during 1995-96 gave 
about the same number of contributions as all 2492 zip code areas in which people of 
color make up 50% or more, even though the population of the 2492 zip codes is sixty 
times greater than the twenty-six highest-giving zip codes. Id. at 2. Zip code 10021 in New 
York, whose 107,000 residents are 91 % white, gave $9.3 million, while the 9.5 million resi-
dents of the 483 communities that are more than 90% people of color gave $5.5 million. 
Id. at 1 (Executive Summary). 
82 Ellen Miller, Guess What? Political Donors Are Old, Rich, White Men, THE HILL (D.C.), 
July 1, 1998, at 5 [hereinafter Guess What?]. 
83 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 1, at 12. 
84 See id. at 13. 
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C. Women's Fundraising Prowess 
The ability of female candidates to collect campaign contribu-
tions is much greater than that of minority candidates, and in some 
circumstances, better than that of white, male candidates.85 However, 
this does not mean that female candidates do not face fundraising 
challenges that keep their numbers in Congress much lower than 
their 50% share of the population.86 Theilmann and Wilhite con-
cluded that aggregate funding received by women was not 
significantly different than male candidates' funding.87 However, al-
though women were found to be at less of a financial disadvantage, 
the authors' determination of a "total impact" of race and sex found 
that "black and female candidates suffer indirect discrimination" 
when it comes to fundraising.88 Furthermore, the authors conclude 
that "racial and sexual contribution differentials" will impact elections 
and the make-up of Congress regardless of the intent of the contribu-
tor, ultimately making further sexual and racial integration of Con-
gress "an arduous task. "89 
Despite such empirical evidence that shows women are able to 
compete in attracting campaign donations, some experts still suggest 
that the very nature of being a female candidate puts a politician at a 
disadvantage.9o Susan Carroll, in her book Women as Candidates in 
American Politics, starts with the assumption that women have difficulty 
in raising funds and then attempts to explain the reasons.91 While 
Carroll acknowledges that men also face fundraising problems, she 
notes that there are several reasons why raising funds is particularly 
difficult for women.92 First, Carroll notes that women "may face 
85 Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. The average winning female candidate in the 1994 
election raised $680,000, significantly more than the average successful male candidate's 
total of $562,000. [d. This statistic is not conclusive, however, given that this could mean a 
higher percentage of female incumbents faced stiff competition causing them to raise 
more campaign cash, fewer male incumbents faced stiff competition, or a whole host of 
other possibilities. See id. 
86 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 128; Schneider, supra note 34, at AI. Burrell notes 
that although total amounts raised and spent from various sources have equaled or ex-
ceeded male candidates, money is still a problem because "so few women have been able 
to run as incumbents." See BURRELL, supra note 1 0, at 128. 
87 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 152. 
88 See id. at 154, 162. 
89 [d. at 156-57. 
90 SUSAN J. CARROLL, WOMEN AS CANDIDATES IN AMERICAN POUTICS 49-50 (2d ed. 
1994); FOWLER, supra note 11, at 129. 
91 See CARROLL, supra note 90, at 49-50. 
92 [d. at 50. 
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greater psychological barriers" in asking for money because of past 
socialization roles that did not expect women to be breadwinners.93 In 
addition, Carroll argues that many women are not tuned into "occu-
pational and social networks" that can prove invaluable when trolling 
for dollars.94 Finally, Carroll contends that women are not as accus-
tomed to giving money to politicians and therefore female candidates 
have a hard time raising money from other women.95 
While the inherent problems women face may have an impact on 
their ability to collect campaign donations, recent studies have not 
reflected any perceived difficulty in raising funds96 However, other 
commentators have noted that such difficulties may not be reflected 
in empirical fundraising data because gender may hinder candidates 
in the earlier stages of the recruitment process.97 Some have sug-
gested that female candidates in the early stages of a race may face 
problems with soliciting donors, with gaining the support of party el-
ders, or with primary voters who may tend to be different kinds of 
voters.98 
Despite the conflicting and tenuous conclusions regarding fe-
male candidates' ability to attract campaign donations as compared to 
males, no one questions the unusually low percentage of female 
members of Congress as compared to the general population.99 In 
addition, the vast majority of large donors to political campaigns are 
men rather than women. lOO Given this low percentage of representa-
tion, the fact that men are more likely to contribute to campaigns, 
and the fact that there appears to be inherent differences in male and 
931d. 
941d. 
95 ld. at 51. Carroll quotes Suzanne Paizis, author of the rather dated 1977 book Getting 
Her Elected: A Political Woman's Handbook, as saying "While 'she' is writing a $5 check for her 
favorite woman candidate (and considering that a sizable donation), 'he' is writing a $50 
or $500 check for the candidate of his choice (usually male)." ld. In addition, Carroll notes 
that female candidates in a 1976 study most often cited money as a major problem, in-
voked by 58% of congressional candidates and almost 53% of statewide candidates. ld. at 
51-52. 
96 THEILMANN & WILlUTE, supra note 10, at 152; Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. 
97 FOWLER, supra note 11, at 129. Fowler cites Carroll as suggesting that the general 
election may reflect equality for women, but the discrimination may actually be present in 
the nomination stage or earlier. ld. 
98 ld. Fowler notes that little research has been done in this area, making concrete 
conclusions with regard to female candidates' ability to raise money a difficult proposition. 
Seeid. 
99 See Election 2000, supra note 28. 
100 Miller, Guess What?, supra note 82, at 5. Miller points out that a survey of donors 
who gave over $200 were 80% male. ld. 
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female candidates' fundraising (if not in aggregate donations than in 
the source of those donations), it follows that female candidates in 
general will feel the effect of reform in ways different than male can-
didates.10l Terry Smith concludes that, "the current system of cam-
paign finance discriminates against women ... [and] is unable to fos-
ter even symbolic diversity. "102 
In addition to female candidates' problems, minority candidates 
appear to face a host of fundraising problems that differ from those 
of the average white, male candidate, meaning that these candidates 
also will experience different effects as the result of reform than the 
average candidate. l03 Because of these unique differences, it is essen-
tial for any campaign finance reform proposal to alter the laws to 
promote the election of minority and female candidates rather than 
inadvertently hinder their prospects.104 
III. AN ABUNDANCE OF PROPOSALS 
A. Attacking a Key Element to Success: Political Action Committees 
Political Action Committees (PACs) are one of the primary tar-
gets when reformers look to alter the current campaign finance sys-
101 SeeTHEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 149. There is some evidence that indi-
vidual contributors are hostile to women, but in general it appears as though women col-
lect a good percentage of their money from individual contributors, which means more 
time spent on fundraising activities. [d. 
102 Terry Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 845, 865 (2000). 
Articles on women in politics regularly cite money as a barrier for female candidates. See 
William March, Women Set to Launch Challenge, TAMPA ThIBUNE, Aug. 19,2001, at 1. March 
notes that, "several experts agree that money is one problem for many female candidates 
of both parties .... Women are more likely to come to politics from civic or community 
activities than business, and may therefore have less access to fundraising networks .... " 
[d. Indeed, the general notion even in smaller political markets is that women have a 
harder time raising campaign cash. Kimberly Marselas, Women Succeeding in Political Arena, 
MARYLAND GAZETTE (Glen Burnie), Mar. 28, 2001, at AI. Marselas notes that, "Female 
candidates, if they can win the support of their party, still lag behind men when it comes to 
getting financial backing." [d. 
103 SeeTHEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 76-77; Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9; 
Vogel, supra note 71, at 3B. See generally The Color of Money, supra note 71. 
104 See THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 
1390. Theilmann and Wilhite explain that with the current campaign finance structure, 
"further sexual and racial integration of Congress will be an arduous task," indicating that 
the already delicate situation must be factored when weighing a change. See THEILMANN & 
WILHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57. Sunstein's article warns that campaign finance reform 
needs to avoid joining the list of regulations and legislation that have resulted in unin-
tended consequences. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1390. 
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tem.105 In order to understand what altering PACs would do to female 
and minority candidates, it is important to understand what PACs are 
and how they function. 
Political committees are required to register with the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) and are subject to limits on campaign 
contributions and sources of contributions.l°6 PACs are political 
committees that may be eligible for multicandidate political commit-
tee status, which brings with it an ability to donate more money.107 
Multicandidate political committees can make contributions to any 
candidate or to their committee in any federal election up to $5000, 
not more than $15,000 in a calendar year to any political committee 
maintained by a national party, and up to $5000 per year to other po-
litical committees, including local and state party committees.lo8 
PACs also employ another method to aid their candidates of 
choice: bundling.109 In essence, bundling allows a group to collect a 
105 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK 159 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 
1997). Steven F. Stockmeyer, former executive director of the National Association of 
Business Political Action Committees, a collection of over 120 PACs, told the Committee 
on House Oversight in 1995 that "PACs have become the whipping boy of the campaign 
finance debate. For 20 years, professional reform groups have engaged in a McCarthy-like 
attack on PACs and this narrow view has been repeated by an unquestioning media." Id. 
106 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 (4),433 (2000) (amended 
1974). 
107 Federal Election Commission, 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e) (3); CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, 
A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105, at 6. The term "multicandidate committee" means: 
a political committee which (i) has been registered under section 303 [USCS 
§ 433] for a period of not less than 6 months, which has received contJ'ibu-
tions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political party or-
ganization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal 
office. 
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (4). 
lOS 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2). The term "election" with regard to the above statute, and all 
parts of the statute that mention election, is defined as: 
(A) a general, special, primary, or runoff election; (B) a convention or caucus 
of a political party which has authority to nominate a candidate; (C) a pri-
mary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating 
convention of a political party; and (D) a primary election held for the ex-
pression of a preference for the nomination of individuals for election to the 
office of President. 
2 U.S.C. § 431 (1) (A)-(D). This means, for instance, that the contribution limit of $5000 
per multicandidate political committee to any given candidate per election allows a com-
mittee to give $5000 in the primary and another $5000 in the general election and in any 
special or runoff election that includes that candidate. See id.; 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). 
109 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (8). The provision states: 
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large number of donations from a sizable group of donors, bundle 
them together, and present them to a candidate. no This loophole re-
quires certain reporting criteria for "earmarked" donations.111 Ear-
marked donations are those in which there is "a designation, instruc-
tion, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect, express or implied, 
oral or written, which results in all or any part of a contribution or 
expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf of, a clearly 
identified candidate or a candidate's authorized committee."l12 Re-
porting of such earmarked contributions requires that the conduit or 
intermediary report to the FEC and the recipient candidate the do-
nor's name and mailing address, and for individuals making contribu-
tions over $200, their occupation and employer.1l3 The recipient then 
must report any conduit that provided one or more earmarked con-
tribution over $200, the total amount of contributions from the con-
duit, and the information identifying individuals giving more than 
$200.114 
The FEC regulations alter this structure if it is determined that 
the conduit exercised "direction or control" over the choice of the 
recipient candidate; if no "direction or control" exists, then there is 
no effect on the conduit's contribution limit to the candidate; how-
ever, if the FEC determines there was "any direction or control," the 
contribution will count against the limits of both the individual and 
the conduit.115 The term "direction or control," however, appears 
meaningless in light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals de-
cision in Federal Election Commission v. National Republican Senatorial 
Id. 
For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions 
made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular can-
didate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise 
directed through an intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be 
treated as contributions from such person to such candidate. The intermedi-
ate or conduit shall report the original source and the intended recipient of 
such contribution to the Commission and to the intended recipient. 
110 See id.; Curran, supra note 3. 
m 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2); 11 C.F.R § 110.6; Geoffrey M. Wardle, Note, Political Contri-
butions and Conduits After Charles Keating and EMILY's List: An Incremental Approach to Reform-
ing Federal Campaign Finance, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 531, 535 (1996); Curran, supra note 
3. 
112 Id. § 1l0.6(b)(l) (2000). 
115 Id. § 110.6(c)(l)(i), (iv)(A). 
114Id. § 110.6(c) (2) (i)-(ii). 
115 Id. § 110.6(d) (1)-(2). 
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Committee, in which the court found no "direction or control" when a 
national party helped a small, defined number of candidates. 116 
Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes, Common Cause's for-
mer president and former vice president for issue development, re-
spectively, note that most people believe that PACs were created out of 
the reform of the federal campaign finance laws in 1974, when in re-
ality PACs have been around since the 1950s.117 However, the 1974 
amendments, which allowed entities with government contracts to 
operate PACs for the first time, paved the way for the explosion in the 
number ofPACs today. lIS The number ofPACs grew to 4079 in 1996, 
more than six times the number in 1974.119 
The rise of PACs and their supposed negative influence on the 
electoral process has caused reformers to propose a plethora of 
changes to the current campaign finance laws, ranging from nibbling 
on the edges to a complete ban of all PACS.120 Some reform proposals 
have merely suggested reducing PAC contribution limits from the 
current $5000 to any given candidate in any given election to a lower 
amount, thus reducing their ability to give significant sums of money 
to candidates.l2l 
116 See966F.2d 1471, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Wardle, supra note 111, at 541-42. In this 
case, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) pre-selected four 1986 Sen-
ate candidates and proceeded to solicit donations on their behalf. FEC, 966 F.2d at 1473. 
The Committee sent out letters saying it would divide the money equally among four can-
didates, only giving their states and not their names. Id. The court said this was not "direc-
tion or control." See id. at 1478. Since this decision, there has been an increase in the 
number of political interest organizations that have supported federal candidates by bun-
dling. Wardle, supra note Ill, at 558. 
117 Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring 
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1136 (1994) (pointing out the com-
mon misconception about the history ofPACs). 
118Id. at 1136-37. The authors explain that there was nothing accidental or coinciden-
tal by the explosion in the number ofPACs-the 1974 provision, later amended by a 1976 
provision, "was designed by special interests to protect PACs and to enhance the role of 
PACs and was not proposed or enacted as a reform." Id. at 1136 n.55, 1137. 
119 O'CONNOR & SABATO (3d ed.), supra note 5, at 336. 
120 SeeH.R.151, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 2866, 106th Cong. (1999); Panel Discussion: 
Revolutionizing Campaign Finance-An Appraisal of Proposed Reforms, 13 J. L. & POLITICS 163, 
165 (1997) [hereinafter Revolutionizing Campaign Finance] ; Curran, supra note 3. 
121 H.R. 151, 107th Cong. (2001). One of the provisions in Rep. Thomas E. Petri's, R-
Wis., bill includes reducing the maximum PAC contribution from $5000 to $2000. Id. § 8; 
Curran, supra note 3. The article explains that President Clinton's campaign finance re-
form legislation in 1993 had originally considered lowering the $5000 limit for PACs, and 
also notes that the bill at the time included a provision to lower PAC contributions to 
$2500 in Senate races. See Curran, supra note 3. 
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Other reform proposals have been more significant, including 
the complete ban of political action committees' ability to give money 
to candidates.122 This reform, although proposed, may not be a viable 
reform as even proponents of the idea admit that it may be found un-
constitutional because it would restrict political speech.I23 Finally, a 
more popular and perhaps more constitutional proposal includes 
banning the practice of bundling, a tool PACs have used to increase 
the coffers of selected candidates.124 A ban on the practice would no 
longer allow PACs to solicit donations to a candidate from a large 
122 H.R. 2866, 106th Congo (1999). Rep. Nick Smith's, R-Mich., proposed bill in the 
last Congress would have amended FECA to state, "[NJo political action committee may 
make any contribution to any candidate or any authorized committee of the candidate 
with respect to any election for Federal office." Id. § 101. During a panel discussion spon-
sored by the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, panelists dis-
cussed changes to campaign finance laws, including a complete ban on PAC contributions 
and expenditures, or a reduction of PAC contribution limits to $1000 per candidate per 
election. Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 163-65. 
123 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105, at 162. Joel M. Cora, 
Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, testified in front of the Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration in 1996, telling members of the committee that there is no 
Court precedent that would uphold a total ban on PACs, stating "Political contributions 
are fundamentally protected by the First Amendment, as embodiments of both speech and 
association." Id. The moderator of an ABA panel's discussion on campaign finance said 
that although the idea of banning PACs would be discussed, he noted that a complete ban 
could be "declared unconstitutional" and so also asked participants to discuss reducing the 
PAC contribution limit. Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 165. One par-
ticipant, the aforementioned Steven Stockmeyer, affiliated with an association of PACs, 
called the idea of a complete ban, "absolute nonsense," adding that 'The PAC ban is un-
constitutional, as they themselves admit in the bill." Id. at 179. Stockmeyer continued, "It's 
a tongue-in-cheek ban, if it's anything. It's two fingers crossed behind your back. What it 
basically says is, 'We know this is unconstitutional so we have to have a fallback provision-
in case it is found unconstitutional-which would establish a new PAC limit.'" Id. 
124 See H.R. 151, 107th Congo (2001). Another proposal in Rep. Petri's bill would insert 
language that states, "No political action committee ... may act as an intermediary or 
conduit with respect to a contribution to a candidate for federal office." Id. § 5; Ian Ayres 
& Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for 
Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REv. 837, 869 (1998). The authors' proposal for mandated 
donor anonymity would "effectively outlaw bundling" by keeping PACs from getting the 
credit for soliciting the donations. See Ayres & Bulow, supra, at 869-70; Wertheimer & Weiss 
Manes, supra note 117, at 1128; Wardle, supra note 111, at 573; Curran, supra note 3. Cur-
ran's article, in discussing tile fighting regarding President Clinton's campaign finance bill 
in 1993, lists the anti-bundling provision as one of the sources of consternation. See Cur-
ran, supra note 3; Praposals at a Glance, supra note 4. The article gives an overview of various 
campaign finance-related bills in the 105th Congress, listing Rep. Sam Farr's, D-Cal., 
measure which would ban bundling, among other things. Praposals at a Glance, supra note 
4. 
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number of donors and package them together as one large donation 
free from the $5000 limit imposed on PACs.125 
PACs generally have been known to give heavily to incumbent 
members of Congress rather than challengers.126 Because of this real-
ity, it would seem as though any proposal that purports to reduce the 
power of PACs would help challengers and therefore benefit women 
and minority candidates, because of their tendency to be challenger 
candidates.127 However, not all PACs follow the narrow-minded, in-
cumbent-oriented script that many anti-PAC reformers claim.128 PACs 
that follow ideological strategies give money to incumbents, challeng-
ers and candidates in open-seat elections who share "their broad ide-
ology or positions on specific, often emotionally charged issues such 
as abortion. "129 Ideologically driven PACs will often give money to 
candidates in close elections, and such PACs "rarely give money to 
members of Congress for the sake of securing access to the legislative 
process. "130 
Indeed, although experts claim that over 70% of PAC money 
goes to incumbents, minority and female candidates do better than 
expected with regard to PAC contributions. l3l Theilmann and Wil-
hite, in their book Discrimination and Congressional Campaign Contribu-
tions, note that there is both good and bad news with regard to blacks 
and women and PACs.132 The authors explain that "the tendency of at 
least some types of PACs to support non-incumbent blacks and 
women is encouraging," because the authors state that "without sub-
stantial institutional support such candidates have little chance of 
125 See Curran, supra note 3. 
126 Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1135. The authors explain that, "For 
most PACs, contributions to challengers are seen as a waste of money. Moreover; few PACs 
are willing to run the risk of antagonizing an incumbent Member of Congress by contrib-
uting to his or her opponent." Id.; Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 172-
73. Donald Simon, former Acting President of Common Cause, notes that "over 70% of 
PAC money goes to incumbents," leading him to conclude that "this is a very important 
reason that incumbents are able to consistently outraise, and therefore outspend, chal-
lengers." Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 172-73. 
127 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 106; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 153; 
Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 172-73. 
128 HERRNSON, supra note 7, at 109-10. 
129 Id. at 109. 
130Id. at 109-10. 
m THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 107; Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, su-
pra note 120, at 172-73. 
132 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 107. 
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success. "133 However, the authors go on to highlight the fact that PACs 
are more likely to throw support to candidates in open-seat elections, 
not to those candidates challenging incumbents.134 Aid to open-seat 
candidates will help black and female candidates, but not as much as 
healthy support to challengers, since open seats are less likely to oc-
cur. 135 
Women's PACs really began to make sizable donations in 1992, 
the so-called "year of the woman."136 EMILY's List, a group that funds 
pro-choice Democratic women running for office, stands for the con-
cept that Early Money Is Like Yeast-it makes the dough rise.137 The 
group, founded by Ellen Malcolm, began in 1986 by collecting over 
$350,000 from more than 600 donors,138 The group kept growing, 
and really caught on in 1992, raising $6 million, four times more than 
in any previous year of operation.139 That year also saw the rise of 
other female-oriented groups' ability to raise significant sums.140 
EMILY's List continued to grow, and by 1998, the group had swelled 
to 50,000 members in fifty states with total contributions of $7.5 mil-
lion, all of which helped elect seven new pro-choice Democratic 
women to the House that year.141 The most recent election in 2000 
133 [d. at 107, 152. The authors later explain that "nonincumbent blacks were often 
helped by PAC contributions, most notably by labor and nonaligned PACs," and "non in-
cumbent female candidates appeared to benefit from PAC contributions ... particularly 
prominent were the nonaligned PAC contributions, which totaled between $4700 and 
$8200 more to women candidates in four of the five elections." [d. at 152. 
134 [d. at 107. While Theilmann and Wilhite's work is one of the most comprehensive 
studies of campaign contributions to minority and female candidates, it was published in 
1991, before the real influx of PAC money from female-oriented groups. ELEANOR CLIFT & 
TOM BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE LAST GLASS CEILING 99 (2000); 
RICHARD LOGAN Fox, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 116-17, 141 n.7 
(1997); Mary Lynn F. Jones, A Big Leap Year; Women Candidates Capture Greatest Number of 
Seats Since 1992, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2000, at 3. See generally THEILMANN & WILHITE, 
supra note 10. 
135 See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 14, at 64-65. 
136 LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 116-17. 
137 CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 134, at 17. 
138 [d. at 88. 
139 LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 117; Kay Mills, Trends Point to Large Gains Among 
Women in Congress, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 18, 1992, at 1. 
140 LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 117, 141 n.7. The Women's Campaign Fund in 1992 
raised $1.3 million, almost twice as much as its previous record; the Hollywood Women's 
Political Committee contributed $543,671; the National Organization for Women contrib-
uted $593,845; and the National Women's Political Caucus contributed $500,000. [d. 
141 CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 134, at 99. This is the largest increase of Democratic 
women in the House in a non-presidential election year. [d. 
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continued the upward trend of contributions from EMILYs List: The 
group doled out almost $9 million to female candidates.142 
Despite some experts explaining that restrictions on PACs would 
ultimately help challengers because PAC money tends to flow to in-
cumbents, many political operatives with the needs of female and mi-
nority candidates in mind do not support imposing restrictions on 
PACS.143 Perhaps there is no better real-life example of minority can-
didates and PAC money than Georgia Congressman John Lewis,144 
Lewis describes himself as a "grass-roots candidate" who did not have 
a large following of supporters who could write $1000 checks when he 
first decided to run for Congress.145 In his own words, he claims he 
"was able to mount a credible and ultimately successful bid for Con-
gress only because of the support given me by labor union political 
action committees and a few other PACs. "146 Lewis succinctly explains 
the role of PACs in his political rise: "If not for the support of these 
'special interests,' this former civil rights worker, this poor son of a 
sharecropper would not have had a prayer of making it to the U.S. 
House of Representatives. "147 
Lewis' support is not an isolated occurrence in the minority 
community and among minority congressmen.148 Jesse Jackson, Jr., 
first elected to Congress from Illinois's second district in a special 
election in 1995, has said that he cannot raise enough from his dis-
trict, so as he puts it, "I have to go to PACs. "149 
Indeed, the elimination or weakening of PACs has been known to 
be a dangerous reform for black candidates, given that both black 
men and women have received more than half of their contributions 
142Jones, supra note 134, at 3. 
143 The Campaign Finance System and Its Impact on Candidates of Color In-Kind Donations to 
Political Campaigns [hereinafter In-Kind Donations to Political Campaigns], 43 How. L. J. 25, 
34 (1999); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note II7, at II35;Jon Friedman, The Found-
ing Mother, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 50; John Lewis, In Defense of PACs, 
WASH. POST, July 1,1994, atA25; Elizabeth Schwinn, Loblly Laws: Women May Win an Exemjr 
tion, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 31, 1993, at AI0; Shanahan, supra note 71, 
at 9. 
144 DUNCAN & LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 392. Although Lewis won in 1986 in the 
general election with a vote total of 75%, he had to endure a strong primary challenge 
from state Sen. Julian Bond. Id. Bond beat Lewis in the primary, but it was close enough to 
force a run-off in which Lewis won the nomination with 52%. Id. 
145 Lewis, supra note 143, at A25. 
146 Id. 
147Id. 
146 In-Kind Donations to Political Campaigns, supra note 143, at 34. 
149 Id.; DUNCAN & LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 448. 
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from PACs in the past. I50 Ellen Miller, a member of the Board of Di-
rectors at the Center for Responsive Politics, has been quoted explain-
ing that "the people who live in African-Americans' districts can't af-
ford to pay to play."I5I For this reason, John Bonifaz, the founder and 
executive director of the National Voting Rights Institute, has said that 
eliminating PACs "essentially knocks out the one place where labor 
and minority candidates have an ability to compete .... It's a classic 
false reform ... put out by people who want to retain the status quo 
and pretend they've taken a step toward reform when they've only 
exacerbated the present system. "152 
Other experts have echoed these sentiments, warning that even 
the best intentions when enacting campaign finance reform could 
lead to unintended consequences.I5!! Cass Sunstein, a University of 
Chicago law professor, writes that any reform that includes restricting 
or eliminating PACs could lead to the unintended consequence of 
reducing a powerful resource for minority candidates.I54 Sunstein ex-
plains that "Sometimes minority candidates can succeed only with the 
help of PACs specifically organized for their particular benefit. "155 
The importance of PAC money to minority candidates crystallized in a 
formal policy sense during the 1993 struggle over campaign finance 
reform in which the Congressional Black Caucus delayed in support-
ing any reform in part because of provisions regarding PACs.I56 In 
short, PACs playa prominent role in the financial security of minority 
candidates, particularly black candidates, and any restriction on this 
150 Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. Shanahan explains that in the 1994 election, 53% of 
the contributions to black male candidates and 54% of the contributions to black female 
candidates came from PACs; PAC contributions to Hispanic and white men and women 
ranged from 37 to 42%. [d. 
151 [d. 
152 [d. Shanahan explains that Bonifaz actually would like to get rid of all interest-
group funding of campaigns, but until that happens, minorities will need to continue to 
rely on PAC money. [d. 
us Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1390, 1409-10. 
154 [d. at 1410. 
155 [d. at 1409. 
156 See David J. Weidman, Comment, The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance: ~ 
jecting the Hysterical Call for Publicly Financed Congressional Campaigns, 63 ThNN. L. REv. 775, 
783 (1996) (noting that the Black Congressional Caucus "has vehemently opposed any 
proposals to eliminate PAGs"); Curran, supra note 3. Curran notes that PACs make major 
contributions to "many African American House Members, who often lack large contribu-
tor bases in their own districts." Curran, supra note 3. 
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funding source would disproportionately affect this already under-
represented group.157 
With regard to women and PACs, the hesitation to reform is just 
as intense as in the minority community because of the importance of 
"women's issues" PACS.158 Commentators have explained that one of 
the reasons women have been able to equal or exceed men in fund-
raising has been the rise of women's issues PACS)59 In his book Gender 
Dynamics in Congressional Elections, Richard Logan Fox quotes several 
campaign managers of female candidates who explained the impor-
tance of this money: '''The contributions from the women's groups 
were vital ... I don't know where we would have got [sic] the money 
we needed without EMILYs LiSt."'160 Another campaign manager for 
a female candidate explained, '''The money from the women's groups 
was crucial for us. '''161 
In fact, experts across the board seem to agree that the success of 
these "women's issue" PACs have greatly aided female candidates.162 
Nancy E. McGlen and Karen O'Connor, in their book Women, Politics, 
and American Society, explain that, "Recent efforts by women's PACs ... 
have been critical in alleviating the financial obstacles faced by 
women candidates. "163 Barbara C. Burrell, in her book A Women s Place 
157 See DAVID A. BOSITIS, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS IN THE 103RD CONGRESS 
28-29 (1994) [hereinafter THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS]. Bositis explains that be-
cause "many of their districts are among the poorest in the nation, Caucus members are 
more dependent upon contributions from political action committees (PACs) than are 
other members of the House." [d. at 28. Bositis also cites figures showing that the twenty-
eight Caucus districts that have black voting-age populations of over 50% in 1989 had a 
mean household income of $30,878, while the figure for all districts was $38,453. [d. Also 
in 1989, the proportion of people living in poverty in these districts was 24.2% compared 
to 13.1 % nationally. [d. at 29; The Federal Election Commission Twenty Year Report, 32 (1995), at 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/2Oyear.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Twenty Year 
Report]. The Report notes that 'Without PAC funding, some say minority candidates could 
not amass sufficient funds to communicate effectively with the electorate." Twenty Year 
Report, supra, at 32. 
158 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 128, 130; CARROLL, supra note 90, at 171; LOGAN 
Fox, supra note 134, at 116-17; NANCY E. MCGLEN & KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN, POLI-
TICS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 86 (2d ed. 1998); Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Schwinn, 
supra note 143, at AlO. 
159 LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 116. 
160 [d. at 117. 
161 [d. 
162 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 128, 130; CARROLL, supra note 90, at 171; LOGAN 
Fox, supra note 134, at 117; MCGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 86. 
163 McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 86. The authors list EMILY's List, NOW 
PAC, the Women's Campaign Fund, Women in the Senate and House (WISH), and Re-
publican Network to Elect Women (RENEW) as some of the critical groups. [d. 
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Is in the House, explains that, "PACs have made a difference and made 
women major players in the electoral process .... [T]he women's 
PACs have become crucial elements in the process of electing women 
to the U.S. Congress."164 Finally, Susan Carroll notes that women's 
PACs are important for two essential functions: raising money and 
performing other tasks that have fallen to political parties in the past, 
including candidate recruitment, training and "in-kind services. "165 In 
short, it seems as though commentators and experts agree, "The exis-
tence of these groups is essential for female candidates. "166 
It is clear that reducing the influence of PACs by lowering contribu-
tion limits or banning them outright would negatively effect female 
candidates, but proponents of "women's issue" PACs also have an-
other group of enemies: those who wish to ban bundling.167 Bundling 
involves soliciting money for candidates, combining the donations 
and then sending the money to candidates endorsed by the group.16S 
Certainly many commentators have not been supportive of the 
bundling loophole.169 However, the more popular position among 
female activists is that cutting out bundling without an exemption for 
non-lobbying PACs would have a disproportionately negative impact 
on female candidates.17o These commentators suggest political com-
mittees, like EMILYs List, that do not engage in lobbying should be 
exempted from a bundling ban because they do not seek access to 
legislators once they are elected; therefore, there is no possibility of 
wrong doing. l7l EMILYs List head Malcolm wrote in a New York Times 
op-ed piece, 'The last thing EMILYs List wants is a loophole [exempt-
ing non-lobbying PACs] that would pour special-interest money into 
164 BURRELL, supra note 10, at 128, 130. 
165 CARROLL, supra note 90, at 171. 
166 LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 117. 
167 See Jason P. Conti, Book Note, The Money Chase: How Proposed Changes to Campaign 
Finance Laws Could Impact Female Candidates, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 105, 116-20 (2001). 
168 See Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Schwinn, supra note 143, at A10. 
169 Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1128, 1142. The authors write: "The 
bundling loophole poses a serious threat to the integrity of existing federal contribution 
limits .... " Id.; Ayres & Bulow, supra note 124, at 869. The authors contend that bundling 
"allows groups of individual contributors to buy access or influence." Ayres & Bulow, supra 
note 124, at 869. 
170 Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Schwinn, supra note 143, at AlO. For example, 
Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., a former head of EMILY's List, strongly supports the con-
tinuation of bundling. Schwinn, supra note 143, at A10. 
!7l SeeH.R. 3, 103d Congo § 501 (1993) (including such a ban for non-lobbying PACs); 
Wardle, supra note Ill, at 550-51; Bundling Makes Emily's List, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, 
at 5; Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Schwinn, supra note 143, at AI0. 
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campaigns. That would take us back to the very system that kept 
women out of office. "172 
Given the nature of the fundraising that these groups engage in, 
little question exists that taking away bundling would be a handi-
cap.173 Indeed, some have called the bundling loophole EMILYs List's 
"life blood."174 By taking away EMILYs List and similarly minded 
groups' ability to generate funds, female candidates would be stripped 
of one of their few financial advantages and thus put in an even more 
unenviable position.175 One commentator, Herbert Alexander, former 
director of the Citizens Research Foundation at the University of 
Southern California, explains bundling by noting: "I don't call it 
[bundling] a loophole ... Blacks and women are under-represented 
in Congress. They hit on a way of networking and now they're told, 
'You can't do that.'''176 
In short, any reform proposal that limits the amount of contribu-
tions to candidates from PACs, bans PACs from making contributions, 
or bans the practice of bundling would have a serious impact on fe-
male and minority candidates)77 What might start as a noble attempt 
at reform-reigning in the supposed power of PACs-would put the 
already under-represented female and minority candidates in an even 
more powerless position should such reforms be enacted.178 
172 Ellen R. Malcolm, Reining Big Givers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,1993, atA23. 
173 See Wardle, supra note 111, at 565; Pat Swift, Gender Gap Plays a &le in Campaign 
Funding, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 18,2000, at 7C. 
174 Bundling Makes Emily's List, supra note 171, at 5. 
175 See Gail Collins, Why the Women Are Fading Away, N.¥. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, § 6 
(Magazine), at 54 [hereinafter Why the Women]. Collins writes: 
[C]ampaign finance reform keeps receding, and some contrarians say that 
Emily's List is one of the reasons. That's near-heresy: Emily's List, a political 
action committee that "bundles" donations from backers interested in pro-
moting Democratic women in politics, has done more than any group to put 
women's campaigns on an equal financial level with men's. Still, nearly any 
discussion of finance reform inevitably raises the question of what such re-
form would do to Emily. 
Collins, Why The Women, supra, at 54; Schwinn, supra note 143, at AIO. Schwinn describes 
the bundling loophole as "a loophole that means big bucks for women candidates and 
others." Schwinn, supra note 143, atAIO. 
176 Schwinn, supra note 143, atAI0. 
177 See BOSITIS, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAucus, supra note 157, at 28-29; BUR-
RELL, supra note 10, at 128,130; CARROLL, supra note 90, at 171; LOGAN Fox, supra note 
134, at 117; McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 86; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1410; 
Curran, supra note 3; Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Schwinn, supra note 143, at AIO; 
Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. 
178 Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1409-10. 
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B. The Belle of the Reform Ball: Soft Money 
Another popular proposal reformers target when discussing 
campaign finance reform involves soft money.179 Soft money officially 
arose out of the 1979 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA), in which Congress amended the law to include regula-
tions that exclude state and local party-building activities from the 
federal contribution limits outlined in FECA.180 The FEC has since 
decided the 1979 amendments allow individuals and organizations to 
give unlimited amounts of money to the national parties' state and 
local party-building campaign accounts, money that is not subject to 
the strict caps found in FECA.181 This money-referred to as soft 
money-is generally intended to be used for party-building expendi-
tures at the state and local levels and cannot be spent in conjunction 
with federal candidates.182 Soft money provides a vehicle through 
179 See S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 22, 107th Congo (2001); S. 17, 107th Congo 
(2001); H.R 1637, 107th Congo (2001); H.R 380, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2941, 106th 
Congo (2000); S. 1816, 106th Congo (1999); S. 26, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 417, 106th 
Congo (1999); Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 620, 633 (2000); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1128. 
180 Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder,Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 
100 COLUM. L. REv. 598 (2000). 
181 Direct contributions from political parties are regulated like PACs, meaning that 
they can give up to $5000 per election (with the primary and the general election consid-
ered two separate elections) to any given candidate. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(2), 431 (1) (A)-
(D); Briffault, supra note 179, at 625. However, the parties enjoy two additional special capa-
bilities to help candidates: First, party committees can engage in coordinated expenditures 
that do not count against the $5000 cap, but instead are governed by a separate calculating 
mechanism that still results in a cap, but it is higher. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d), (h); Briffault, 
supra note 179, at 625-26. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated 
FECA's caps on party<oordinated expenditures with a party's congressional candidates. See 
FECvs. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2000) 
("Colorado Republican II"). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Tenth Circuit and 
found that a party's coordinated expenditures "may be restricted to minimize circumven-
tion of contribution limits." FEC V. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 
2351,2371 (2001); Briffault, supra note 179, at 625. The second party provision is that state 
party committees can undertake "grass-roots" efforts, including get-out-the-vote drives and 
voter registration, in unlimited amounts so long as the money complies with FECA's source 
and cap requirements. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 (8)(B) (x) (2), (xii)(2), 431 (9)(B) (viii)(2), (ix) (2); 
Briffault, supra note 179, at 626. Because the 1979 amendments excluded state and local 
party-building expenditures from contribution limits, this allowed contributors to give 
unlimited amounts of money to the national parties' state and local party-building ac-
counts, dubbed "non-federal" accounts. Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 598. 
After the 1979 amendments, soft money began to grow in the 1980's, rising from $19 mil-
lion in 1980 to $45 million in 1988, and was used to "build the infrastructure of the na-
tional parties," including staff costs, polling, data processing and office space. Briffault, 
supra note 179, at 629. 
182 SeeAnsolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 598-99. 
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which wealthy individuals and groups can help influence policy by 
contributing unlimited amounts of cash to the national parties, a ma-
jor reason why critics find it to be such a corrupting influence.l83 Soft 
money has grown increasingly more influential in elections across the 
country, increasing at an exponential rate in 1992, 1996,2000, and in 
the first six months of 200I.l84 
In addition to the general growth in soft money receipts, the par-
ties have begun to expand the uses for soft money, including spread-
ing the wealth towards congressional campaigns.185 The 1997-98 mid-
term election cycle was the first time that soft money played a large 
role in congressional campaigns; before that election, soft money was 
mostly limited to presidential campaigns.186 In addition, both political 
parties have turned to "issue advocacy" as another means of utilizing 
soft money.187 Issue advocacy ads, which advocate or oppose the cause 
of a candidate, can be partially paid for with a party's soft money so 
long as they do not contain "magic words," including "vote for," 
"elect," "cast your ballot for," "vote against," or "defeat. "188 Through 
this new method, parties have increased the usefulness of soft money 
and now can use these funds to pay for ads that directly aid federal 
candidates. 189 
183 See id. at 60!. 
184 See Alison Mitchell, Bush and McCain Meet on Campaign Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2001, at A20 [hereinafter Bush and McCain Meet]. The 2000 election found the parties 
raising the highest amounts of soft money ever, with the Democrats' party committees 
taking in $243.1 million and the Republicans collecting $244.4 million, for a total of 
$487.5 million. Id. In 1996, the two national political parties together raised $263 million, 
nearly three times as much as was raised in 1992. Steve Campbell, Campaign System Riddled 
with Loopholes; They Render Existing Finance Restrictions Virtually Meaningless, THE PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Me.), Sept. 16, 1997, at lA. Soft money did not stop expanding in the 
1990s. The Democratic and Republican party committees raised $98.8 million in soft 
money ($65.6 million for the GOP and $33.3 million for Democrats) in the first six 
months of 2001, almost triple the amount raised in the first six months of the last non-
presidential election cycle, 1997-98. Ben White, Soft Money Soars for Both Parties as GOP 
Takes in Record Sum for Six-Month Span, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at A9. The parties col-
lected only $54.5 million in the first six months of 1999-2000. Id. 
185 See Briffault, supra note 179, at 630. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 632-33. 
188 Id. at 631-33. The author notes that an FEC Advisory Opinion in 1995 that allowed 
the Republican National Committee to criticize President Clinton by name while discuss-
ing issues led to the widespread use of such "issue" advertising in the 1996 election. Id. at 
632. The Advisory Opinion also stipulated that issue advocacy ads cannot be paid for ex-
clusively through soft money; only a specified portion of the cost can be funded through 
soft money, a ruling that was challenged but failed to yield injunctive relief before the 1998 
election. Id. at 633. 
189 Id. at 633. 
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Although numerous bills contain language concerning banning 
or restricting soft money, the piece of legislation that has engendered 
the most attention over the last several years is that of Arizona Senator 
John McCain (R) and Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold (D).190 
Various forms of this legislation have been proposed and have failed 
in past years, but in 2001 the McCain-Feingold bill passed the Senate 
in a bipartisan 59-41 vote.I91 The legislation bans soft money, in-
creases the aggregate individual contribution limit from $25,000 to 
$37,500, increases the amount an individual can give to a candidate in 
each election from $1000 to $2000, creates provisions for candidates 
running against independently wealthy opponents, and establishes a 
ban on advertising by particular groups thirty days before a primary 
and sixty days before a general election.192 
190 See S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 380, 107th Cong. (2001); see also S. 22, 107th 
Cong. (2001); S. 17, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 1637, 107th Congo (2001); S. 2941, 106th 
Congo (2000); H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999). H.R. 380, the House version of McCain-
Feingold, is sponsored by Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., and Rep. Martin Meehan, D-
Mass. SeeH.R. 380, 107th Congo (2001). Shays-Meehan passed the House in both 1998 and 
1999, but that may have been tied to the fact that members could vote for the proposal 
without repercussion because McCain-Feingold repeatedly died in Senate filibusters. See 
Alison Mitchell, Hoose G.O.P. Seeks New Way to Block Campaign Measure, N.Y. TIMEs,june 25, 
2001, at Al [hereinafter Hoose G.O.P. Seeks New Way]. 
191 See Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate, supra note 5, at AI. Twelve Re-
publicans and forty-seven Democrats joined together to pass the legislation. Id. Despite the 
success, the outcome was far from certain even a short time before the vote. Larry Bivins, 
Thompson Pushes Bill Banning 'Soft Money:- Bipartisan Support CooUl Expedite Vote on &form, 
lENNEssEAN,jan. 23, 2001, at 6A. Bivins quoted Republican Senator from Tennessee Fred 
Thompson as saying, "We have a better chance than ever before to get something done" in 
late january, and Alison Mitchell quoted Thompson just a month and a half later saying, 
"I'm not confident of the outcome." Bivins, supra, at 6A; Alison Mitchell, Before Debate, 
Added Scrutiny of Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Before Debate]. 
The proponents of a ban on soft money said they received a boost in the summer of 2000 
when the Supreme Court ruled that limits on party coordinated expenditures with candi-
dates are justified. Colo. Republican, 121 S. Ct. at 2371; Adam Clymer, The Supreme Qmrt: 
Campair;n Money; Justices UplwUl Curbs on Coordinated Political spending, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2001, at A15. McCain said, "'Clearly this decision demonstrates that McCain-Feingold re-
strictions on campaign contributions are constitutional,'" and Rep. Shays, co-sponsor of 
the House legislation said, "'The Supreme Court's decision is wind in the sails of the 
movement to reform our badly broken campaign finance system .... We are even more 
confident today that the court will uphold a soft-money ban.'" Clymer, The Supreme Coort: 
Campair;n Money, supra, at A15. Opponents, however, noted that proponents "'can take no 
comfort in today's decision,' because 'the Colorado case was about federally restricted 
hard money while McCain-Feingold would ban nonfederal soft money.'" Id. (quoting Sena-
tor Mitch McConnell, R-Ky.) 
192 SeeS. 27, 107th Congo 2001 §§ 101, 102, 308, 304, 201-204 (2001). Both individual 
contribution limits, the aggregate and per candidate per election limit, are indexed for 
inflation. Id. § 308. The new individual contribution limits would be raised in addition to 
other benefits if a candidate's opposition spends over a certain multiple of the threshold 
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The McCain-Feingold legislation has been considered the darling 
of the press, covered extensively in and endorsed by the media.193 The 
media seems quick to decry the use of soft money but has been slow 
to mention any possible good that could come from this funding 
source.194 At least one positive result has been linked to soft money: 
The early use of soft money in the 1980s is considered to have been 
essential to the revitalization of state party operations.195 While this 
may not at first appear to be a positive development given the public's 
general desire to recoil from party labels, many political scientists 
stress the need to maintain strong, healthy political parties when look-
ing to reform the current system.196 
By using soft money, parties can have a profound impact on con-
gressional elections in ways that would not be possible if they had to 
adhere to the low limits imposed by FECA.197 Reformers tend to view 
this increased party role as a negative development, but it also could 
be viewed as a mechanism to increase competition in elections.198 Po-
litical parties, when compared to individuals and PACs, are the most 
likely source for campaign contributions to non-incumbent candi-
limit, which is equal to $150,000 plus $0.04 multiplied by each member of a state's voting 
age population. See id. §§ 304, 308. The legislation also prohibits issue advertising from 
corporate and labor interests thirty days before a primary election and sixty days before a 
general election. Id. § 203. Also, the bill increases the senatorial campaign committee limit 
from $17,500 to $35,000, strengthens the ban on fundraising on federal property, 
strengthens the foreign money ban, ensures the lowest media rates for candidates with 
some exceptions, provides for a study and report on clean elections, increases some penal-
ties for violations, and modifies disclosure provisions. See §§ 308(c), 302, 303, 305, 306, 
312,314,317,501-504. 
193 See Money Trumps Fair Politics, LA. TIMES, Oct. 21 1999, at BIO; Mr. Bush Shauldn't 
Fight McCain's Finance Bill, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 26, 2001, at 12A; Mr. McCain's Medicine, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2000, at A30; W7zeres the Outrage?, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,2001, at A36. 
194 RONALD]' HREBENAR ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS 143 (1999). 
195Id. 
196 See Briffault, supra note 179, at 644. The FEe's Twenty Year Report notes that, "vir-
tually all observers agree that parties are essential to American politics." Twenty Year Report, 
supra note 157, at 3l. One political scientist, Larry Sabato, has said, "'The parties help 
stabilize an inherently unstable political system .... Anything tlIat weakens those institu-
tions makes democracy more unstable in the United States.'" Steven Thomma, Reforms Can 
Have Unintended Consequences, SAN DIEGO UNION-ThIBUNE, Mar. 25, 2001, at G6. 
197 HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 155. 
198 See id. at 158; MICHAEL]' MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAlS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM, So-
BERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 153 (1998); Ansolabe-
here & Snyder, supra note 180, at 619; Briffault, supra note 179, at 660; Mitchell, Before 
Debate, Added Scrutiny of Finance Bill, supra note 191, at Al (noting that "some lawmakers 
argue that the ban on soft money will weaken the two-party system by causing donations to 
flow away from parties .... "). 
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dates.199 Because parties tend to mold their campaign expenditures 
around maximizing the number of seats they can win, they are much 
more likely to give to challenger candidates than other sources, such 
as individuals.2OO In fact, authors Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. 
Gais, in their book The Day After Reform, explain that there is an "in-
tense party bias [in the states] in favor of challengers and open-seat 
candidates in close races," adding that parties in most states "give a 
basic level of contributions as risk capital to a wide variety of challeng-
ers and open-seat candidates. "201 
Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr. have 
concluded, "More party money in congressional elections ... would 
probably produce much higher electoral competition. "202 In addition, 
they also have calculated that the reverse situation-reducing the 
fundraising abilities of the political parties-would reduce challenger 
vote shares in the electoral process, mainly because non-incumbents 
have a much easier time attracting party money than PAC money.203 
In addition, parties spend considerable sums for voter registration 
and voter turnout, elements that tend to be key for challenger candi-
dates.204 Proponents of a ban of soft money cite the Brennan Center 
199 HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 153 
(noting that in competitive races, state parties are more likely to help challengers than any 
other source); Briffault, supra note 179, at 660. 
200 Briffault, supra note 179, at 661. 
201 MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 152. 
202 Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 619. 
203 See id. at 608, 611. Although the authors admit that a large reduction in party 
money would reduce challenger vote shares by 2.5%, they conclude this would not 
"change competition in the national elections appreciably" because the typical challenger 
only receives 35% of the vote. See id. at 611. However, one could argue a 2.5% vote loss 
could impact some challengers in tight elections. See id. As Clift and Brazaitis point out, 
challenger candidate Harriett Woods (D) lost by a mere 27,000 votes to incumbent John 
Danforth (R) in the 1982 Missouri Senate race in which she received inadequate party 
support; 2.5% added to Woods' vote total certainly would have helped her win the race 
since she lost by about 1 %. SeeCUFI' & BRAZAITIS, supra note 134, at 87. In addition, pro-
fessors Thad Kousser and Ray LaRaja did a study involving party money and also con-
cluded that a ban on soft money would lead to 2.5% less in votes for challengers, ulti-
mately concluding that "credible challengers will be hurt the most." Thad Kousser & Ray 
LaRaja, Will a Soft Money Ban Stifle Political Competition? The()1'Y and Evidence from the States, 24 
(presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the AnIerican Political Science Association, 
Aug./Sept.2000) (on file with author). 
204 MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 152; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 
617. By studying three states, Ansolabehere & Snyder conclude that if the national parties 
did not provide money for grass roots activities including direct mail and voter registra-
tion, turnout in these states would have been reduced by slightly more than two percent. 
Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 616-17; Ken BentsenJr., Term Limits Would F()1'-
feit Our Right to Clwose, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4,1991, at C15 (expressing the notion that 
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for Justice at NYU School of Law (Brennan Center) for the proposi-
tion that all state and national party committees combined spend 
8.3% of their soft money on voter mobilization, voter registration, and 
get-out-the-vote drives.205 However, in the 2000 election, which saw the 
two national parties raise $487.5 million in soft money, 8.3% works 
out to over $40 million, a hefty sum that challenger candidates would 
have had to raise to mount get-out-the-vote drives if soft money was no 
longer available.206 In addition, Professor Ansolabehere has calculated 
that a soft money ban could force the parties to eliminate up to 20% 
of the money they spend aimed at drawing out new voters, and to cut 
as much as two percent of activities aimed at boosting election-day 
turnout, consequences that hinder challengers and therefore minor-
ity and female candidates.207 In short, a ban on soft money, or a re-
striction on party money, would affect challengers more than incum-
bents.208 
Because female and minority candidates are under-represented 
and therefore tend to be challenger candidates, it naturally follows 
that they would be disproportionately affected by a ban on soft 
money.209 More specifically, additional evidence suggests that female 
and black candidates in particular benefit from party money not just 
by virtue of their challenger status, but by virtue of being female or 
black.210 The Brennan Center has noted that of the thirty-eight mem-
bers of the Congressional Black Caucus, only one benefited from 
party-sponsored issue ads.2l1 However, incumbent black House mem-
bers is not the group reformers should be concerned with; incum-
increasing voter turnout would increase the odds for challengers); Evelyn Theiss, Kucinich, 
Coyne Hopefor Boostfrom Clinton-Gore Visit, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 1, 1996, at 15A 
(quoting a Democratic pollster as saying that a presidential visit "can't hurt the challeng-
ers, and it can help them a little; if it increases voter turnout that helps .... "). 
205 The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money·, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
School of Law (on file with author). 
206 See Mitchell, Bush and McCain Meet, supra note 184, at A20. 
207 See Bentsen, supra note 204, at C15; Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 
3; Election 2000, supra note 28; Thomma, supra note 196, at G6. 
208 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608, 617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660-61. 
209 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; Ansolabehere & Snyder, s'upra note 180, at 608, 617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660; Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3; Election 2000, supra note 28. 
210 McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129. 
211 The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money ~ supra note 205. 
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bents are reelected at extremely high rates each election cycle.212 Soft 
money is important for minority candidates in instances where a vi-
able challenger or a viable participant in an open-seat election needs 
an infusion of cash.213 In fact, evidence shows that when viable minor-
ity and female candidates need money, the party steps forward to pro-
vide support.214 When Eleanor Jordan, a black state legislator, tried to 
unseat Anne Northup in a 2000 Kentucky House race, the Democratic 
party spent $821,837 on advertising; Jordan raised a total of about 
$1.6 million for her campaign.215 In addition, Wilhite and Theil-
mann's book, although written before the real explosion in soft 
money and before the use of soft money in congressional campaigns, 
shows that women and blacks benefit at a greater rate from party 
money than do white, male candidates.216 The authors found the evi-
dence for black candidates more compelling, concluding, "the Demo-
cratic party gave significantly greater contributions to black candidates 
than to their white counterparts in three of the five elections studied," 
which resulted in a racial benefit of about $4000 to $12,000.217 With 
regard to women, the benefit does not appear to be as profound, but 
at least some analyses show that women may get more money from 
the parties than men.218 In short, experts indicate that party support is 
a key element to the success of female and minority candidates.219 
212 See id.; O'CONNOR & SABATO (3rd ed.), supra note 5, at 360-61 (explaining that 
high reelection rates are the norm, ranging well above 90% in most election years in the 
House). 
213 See Cooper, supra note 65, at A12. 
214 See The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money ", supra note 205, at Figure 8. 
215 See id.; Leonard, supra note 68, at A37. 
216 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 129. The authors note that in general 
both parties are more inclined to give greater amounts to black and female candidates. Id. 
They note, however, that the advantage with party money improves their chances of win-
ning only marginally because of the power of incumbency. Id. Theilmann and Wilhite's 
book, published in 1991, came before the explosion of soft money. See Briffault, supra note 
179, at 629-30; Campbell, supra note 184, at lA; Mitchell, Bush and McCain Meet, supra 
note 184, at A20; White, supra note 184, at A9. See generally THEILMANN & WILHITE supra 
note 10. However, it follows that a pattern of party spending pre-soft money that benefits 
certain candidates would continue to help those candidates when soft money is involved. 
See generally THEILMANN & WILHITE supra note 10. 
217 THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 10, at 126. 
218 McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129. Although the authors do not offer concrete evidence on whether females have a 
better time attracting campaign funds from political parties, it seems clear that generally, 
"party support ... [has] more to do with the competitiveness of the race than with the 
gender ofthe candidate." LOGAN Fox, supra note 134, at 124. 
219 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND 
MINORITIES 103-04 (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds., 1994). The authors note 
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For these reasons, many female and minority candidates and po-
litical operatives tend to oppose the elimination of soft money for fear 
that it could weaken the ability of parties to aid candidates.22o The de-
bate in 2001 regarding the House version of the McCain-Feingold bill, 
sponsored by Representatives Christopher Shays, R-Conn., and Martin 
Meehan, D-Mass., indicates that many House minority members have 
grave reservations with banning soft money, fearing such a move 
could have serious repercussions for the future diversity of Con-
gress.221 In fact, even some House Democratic leaders who support a 
soft-money ban have said they understand minority members' reserva-
tions with a ban because of the dire effects it could have on their po-
litical futures.222 However, not all participants in the debate agree with 
that one of the key barriers to the election of women and minorities is weak political par-
ties. Id.; CATHERINE WHITNEY, NINE AND COUNTING, THE WOMEN OF THE SENATE 57 
(2000). The author, in conjunction with the then nine female senators, notes that party 
support and money are the "critical components to women achieving credibility and being 
elected to office." Id.; Penny M. Miller, Staking Their Claim, The Impact of Kentucky Women in 
the Political Process, 84 Ky. LJ. 1163, 1176 (1995/96) [hereinafter Staking Their Claim]. The 
author notes that in recent years the national parties "have played an increasing advoca-
tory role for women in office .... In the last decade, the national parties have taken active 
steps to promote women's candidacies .... " Miller, Staking Their Claim, supra, at 1176. 
220 See Swift, supra note 173, at 7C. The author notes that "women's views of campaign 
finance reform are colored by their preference for fund raising networks and issue groups. 
They tend to oppose eliminating soft money contributions." Id.; Curran, supra note 3. The 
author explains that some members of the Congressional Black Caucus, in the 1993 strug-
gle over President Clinton's campaign finance legislation, seemed to be more interested in 
some form of increased disclosure rather than an outright soft money ban. Curran, supra 
note 3. 
221 Darryl Fears, Keys to a Campaign Bill; Divided Black Caucus Is Heavily Lobbied, WASH. 
POST,July 11, 2001, at AI; Karen Hosler, As 'Soft Money' Ban Foe, Wynn Comes Under Fire; Md. 
Democrat's Stance Could Help Defeat Bill, BALT. SUN,July 12, 2001, at Al (noting that up to 
half of Rep. Albert R. Wynn's, D-Md, Congressional Black Caucus colleagues "appeared to 
be aligned with him" against the Shays-Meehan bill); Alison Mitchell, Blacks and Hispanics 
in House Balk on Campaign Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Blacks 
and Hispanics in House Balk]; Mitchell, House C.O.P. Seeks New Way, supra note 190, at AI; 
Philip Shenon, The Black Caucus, Once a Foe, Enjoys Soft-Money Games, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2001, at AI. Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, D-Miss., noted, "'We'll never be able to match the 
resources the Republicans can generate, but soft money allows us to be competitive.'" See 
Shenon, supra, at AI. Shenon notes that "Mr. Thompson called it hopeless to think that he 
and other black lawmakers from poor, mostly rural districts could ever make up for the 
loss of soft money," and Rep. Earl F. Hilliard, D-Ala., said that a soft-money ban was a 
"'threat to my continued service in the Congress.'" Id. In addition, Shenon points out that 
soft money was spent in November 2000 for a get-out-the-vote drive in Rep. Hilliard's dis-
trict and that soft money is paying for an attorney and a demographer in his effort to avoid 
having his district redrawn in a way that might threaten his reelection. See id. 
222 See Shenon, supra note 221, at AI. Shenon notes that even tlle House leaders who 
support the soft-money ban say black members who oppose the ban "have reason to be 
concerned about a moratorium and that the caucus's voter-education programs in Florida 
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this contention.223 Some argue that soft money is an evil that must be 
eliminated from the political world and contend that minority and 
female candidates will not be harmed by such a ban.224 However, evi-
dence indicates that eliminating soft money, while a politically salient 
idea in light of the passage of McCain-Feingold in the Senate, may 
prove to be disastrous for competition and challengers in particu-
lar.225 Because female and minority candidates tend to be challengers, 
a soft-money ban would fall particularly hard on this group of pro-
spective candidates, a factor that must be considered when Congress 
debates the merits of passing this so-called "reform. "226 
C. Raising the Individual Contribution Limit 
Under FECA, individuals cannot make contributions over $1000 
to any candidate during an election.227 In addition, an individual is 
last November might have put AI Gore in the White House if there had been just a little 
more money." Id. 
22S See The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money ~ supra note 205; Hosler, supra 
note 221, atAl; Memorandum from the Fannie Lou Hamer Project, to the Congressional 
Black Caucus (May 15, 2001), at http://www.flhp.org/cbcmemo.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2002) [hereinafter Memorandum to Congressional Black Caucus]. The Fannie Lou Hamer 
Project is a group working to reshape campaign finance reform as a civil rights issue; the 
group has created the Fannie Lou Hamer standard which, "asks whether a proposed re-
form would make the system more fair for someone like Hamer, a poor woman of color" 
who championed voting rights. See Spencer Overton, Fannie Lou Hamer Wouldn't Like This, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at BU. 
224 See The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money", supra note 205; Hosler, supra 
note 221, at AI; Memorandum to Congressional Black Caucus, supra note 223. Hosler explains 
that Rep. Wynn's stance against a soft-money ban has rankled many of his House Congres-
sional Black Caucus colleagues including party elders like Rep. Charles B. Rangel, D-N.Y., 
and Rep. John Lewis, D-Ga. Hosler, supra note 221, at AI. The Fannie Lou Hamer Project 
argues that soft money's role in get-out-the-vote efforts could be supplemented with hard 
money and/or a bill could allocate federal money for such activities; in addition, the 
group argues that banning soft money will reduce the influence of big business and release 
the stranglehold soft money has on top leadership positions. See Memorandum to Congres-
sional Black Caucus, supra note 223. 
225 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608, 617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660; Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3; Election 2000, supra note 28; Mitchell, 
Campaign Finance BiU Passes in Senate, supra note 5, at AI. 
226 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608, 617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660; Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3; Election 2000, supra note 28. 
2272 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1). "No persons shall make contributions-(A) to any candidate 
and his [or her] authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal 
office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000." Id. The term "election" with regard to the 
above statute, as with multicandidate political committees, means that the contribution 
limit of $1000 allows an individual to give $1000 in the primary and another $1000 in the 
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allowed to give up to $20,000 to a committee or committees organized 
by the national parties and up to $5000 to any other political commit-
tee in a calendar year.228 Finally, in any given calendar year, an indi-
vidual can make no more than $25,000 in total donations. 229 
In the landmark Supreme Court case involving campaign 
finance, Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the individual contribution 
limits set at $1000.230 Since Congress passed FECA in 1974 and the 
Court upheld contribution limits in 1976, the dollar amount has re-
mained unchanged.231 Some reformers have targeted these limits, 
looking, in particular, at raising the $1000 limit on donations to can-
didates and the total limit of $25,000 in any calendar year.232 The 
McCain-Feingold legislation that passed the Senate would hike the 
individual contribution limit from $1000 to $2000 and the aggregate 
individual limit from $25,000 to $37,500.233 
The Supreme Court recently confirmed the constitutionality of 
limiting contributions to candidates in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 
decided in 2000.234 In Nixon, the Court rejected the notion that Mis-
souri's then $1075 limit on candidates for statewide office was too low, 
upholding the idea in Buckley that limits are constitutional unless they 
are "so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, 
general election and in any special or runoff election that includes that candidate. See 2 
U.S.C. §§ 431 (1) (A)-(D), 441a(a) (1). 
228 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (B)-(C). 
229 Id. § 441a(a) (3). 
230 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). While the appellants argued that the $1000 contribution 
ceiling ''unjustifiably burdens First Amendment freedoms, employs overbroad dollar limits, 
and discriminates against candidates opposing incumbent officeholders and minor-party 
candidates in violation of the Fifth Amendment," the Court notes that "It is unnecessary to 
look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corrup-
tion resulting from large individual financial contributions--in order to find a constitu-
tionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id. at 24,26. 
231 See id. at 26; 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A). The individual contribution limit is not in-
dexed for inflation, and therefore has remained at $1000. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
232 S. 176, 107th Congo § 8 (2001) (increasing the individual contribution limit to can-
didates to $3000, and indexing the amount each calendar year "based on the increase in 
the price index"); S. 27, 107th Congo §§ 102, 308 (2001) (increasing the aggregate individ-
ual contribution limit from $25,000 to $37,500); S. 22, 107th Congo § 203 (2001) (increas-
ing the individual contribution limit to candidates to $3000, increasing the limit to politi-
cal parties to $60,000, increasing the limit from individuals to political committees to 
$15,000, and increasing individuals' aggregate limit to $75,000); S. 17, 107th Congo § 102 
(2001) (increasing the aggregate contribution limit for individuals from $25,000 to 
$30,000); H.R. 380, 107th Congo § 102 (2001) (increasing the aggregate contribution limit 
for individuals from $25,000 to $30,000). 
233 S. 27, 107th Congo §§ 102, 308 (2001). 
234 528 U.S. 377, 397-98 (2000). 
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drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and 
render contributions pointless. "235 
Despite the constitutionality of contribution limits, some have 
questioned the logic of imposing such barriers, and there is also dis-
agreement regarding the impact of such limitations on challengers 
and incumbents.236 FEC Commissioner Bradley A. Smith argues that, 
"Contribution limits tend to favor incumbents by making it harder for 
challengers to raise money and thereby make credible runs for 
office," noting that the lower the limit, the more difficult it becomes 
to raise a large amount of needed cash in a short time.237 However, 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority of the Court in Nixon, ad-
dressed the respondent's contention that contribution limits favor 
incumbents over challengers, concluding, ''We found no support for 
the proposition that an incumbent's advantages were leveraged into 
something significantly more powerful by contribution limitations 
applicable to all candidates, whether veterans or upstarts. "238 
Apart from looking just at contribution limits from the chal-
lenger perspective, there is some evidence that blacks and women col-
lect money from individuals in smaller amounts and therefore would 
not benefit from an increase in the contribution limit.239 Theilmann 
and Wilhite, when analyzing individual contributions, note that their 
formula shows that individuals "appear to discriminate against black 
candidates (and to a smaller extent women challengers)," and more 
importantly in this context, "black and female candidates appear to 
be dependent on smaller contributions. ''240 This makes sense for black 
candidates, considering that black members of Congress tend to rep-
resent some of the poorest districts in the country and therefore can-
not rely on individuals within their district to raise large individual 
contributions.241 
2M Id. at 397. 
2S6 Id. at 389-90 nA; CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105, at 
108-09; THEILMANN AND WILHITE, supra note 10, at 146; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights 
Issue, 43 How. LJ. 41, 46-47 (1999); Kathey Pruitt, Rights Group opposes Raising Campaign 
Gift Limit, ATLANTA]. & CONST., Aug. 5, 2000, at 4E. 
~7 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105, at 108-09. 
238 528 U.S. at 389-90 nA. Some reformers do not seem sold on higher limits: Senators 
McCain and Feingold "didn't intend to promote higher hard-money limits but accepted 
them as a necessary compromise." See Janet Hook & Doyle McManus, A Win for Campaign 
Finance Won't Mean Victory/or Reform, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at AI. 
239 THEILMANN AND WILHITE, supra note 10, at 146. 
240 [d. 
241 See BOSITIS, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAucus, supra note 157, at 28. 
138 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:99 
There is evidence that people looking out for the interests of 
black candidates do not wish to see an increase in contribution lim-
its.242 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP), the Southern Regional Council, the Georgia Rural Ur-
ban Summit, and the Fannie Lou Hamer Project, a group that views 
campaign finance reform as a civil rights issue, all objected to a move 
by the Georgia legislature that allowed for an increase of individual 
contribution limits to up to twice their previous level.243 Brenda 
Wright, managing attorney of the National Voting Rights Institute, 
wrote a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice noting that black vot-
ers are "far less likely than white voters to have sufficient funds to con-
tribute at any level to political campaigns," and also indicating that 
white candidates receive a disproportionate amount of large contribu-
tions.244 In addition, at Howard University Law School's 1999 event 
Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, professor and journalist Roger 
Wilkins explained that some "reformers" find the individual contribu-
tion limits to be too low and want to increase them, despite the fact 
that only one-tenth of one percent of individuals gave $1000 in 
1996.245 Finally, the debate over the House companion to McCain-
Feingold, Shays-Meehan, indicated that several minority politicians 
and commentators fear an increase in the individual contribution 
limit would be detrimental to minority candidates in particular.246 
In short, although there is some debate over whether contribu-
tion limits help or hurt challengers, it seems as though women and 
blacks in particular are not inhibited by such limitations; in fact, they 
may benefit from them.247 While raising contribution limits is typically 
just one element in a package of reforms, it does not appear as 
though it would have any benefit to female or black candidates and 
would most likely prove problematic.248 This represents another rea-
son why the McCain-Feingold measure that passed the Senate, with its 
242 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47; Pruitt, supra note 
236, at 4E. 
243 Pruitt, supra note 236, at 4E. 
244 Id. 
245 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47. 
246 See Fears, supra note 221, at AI. 
247 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389-90 n.4.; CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 105, at 108-09; THEILMANN AND WILHITE, supra note 10, at 146; Campaign Finance as a 
Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47; Pruitt, supra note 236, at 4E. 
246 See S. 176, 107th Congo (2001); S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); S. 22, 107th Congo 
(2001); S. 17, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 380, 107th Congo (2001); THEILMANN AND WIL-
HITE, supra note 10, at 146; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47 
(1999); Pruitt, supra note 236, at 4E. 
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increased individual contribution limits, is not reform for black and 
female candidates.249 
D. Putting a Ceiling on Campaign Spending 
There has been plenty of discussion regarding capping the 
amount of money candidates are allowed to spend in a federal elec-
tion.25o Proposals that call for a mandatory so-called "ceiling" on 
spending face strict constitutional dilemmas.251 However, because the 
idea has regularly been floated, a brief mention is deserved.252 
The Supreme Court in Buckley struck down the expenditure limit 
included in FECA, finding that "limitations on campaign expendi-
tures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and 
on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are constitu-
tionally infirm. "253 The Court equated the restriction on spending 
money as being a restriction on political speech.254 For that reason, 
any mandatory spending cap appears as though it would have 
difficulty meeting the Supreme Court's analysis in Buckley.255 In Sep-
tember 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
overruled a district court decision that enforced a campaign expendi-
ture limit in the mayoral race in Albuquerque, New Mexico.256 In en-
249 SeeS. 27, 107th Congo §§ 102, 308 (2001); THEILMANN AND WILHITE, supra note 10, 
at 146; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47 (1999); Pruitt, supra 
note 236, at 4E. 
250 See BURRELL, supra note 10, at 188; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 144; Vincent 
Biasi, Free speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May 
Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281 (1994); Colloquia: Campaign 
Finance Reform: Law and Politics: Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 
ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 161, 170 (1994) [hereinafter ConstitutionalImplications ofCampaignFi-
nance Reform 1; Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 
GEO. LJ. 491, 538n.218 (1997);Joseph Lieberman, The Politics of Money and the Road to Self-
Destruction. 16 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 425, 462-63 (1998); Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, 
supra note 120, at 178; Bradley A. Smith, Point I Counterpoint: Some Problems with Taxpayer-
Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 605 (1999); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, 
supra note 117, at 1152; Van Der Werf, supra note 3, at AI. 
251 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 143. 
252 See supra sources cited note 250. 
253 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
254Id. at 19. "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on 
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression 
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size 
of the audience reached." Id. 
255 See id. Blasi, however, argues that candidate time protection is an important ele-
ment that could help make spending caps constitutional. See Biasi, supra note 250, at 1284. 
256 Homans v. City of Albuquerque, No. 01-2271, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19780, at *10-
11 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 2001). 
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joining the city from enforcing the limit and ordering an injunction, 
the appeals court noted that the reasons listed for the expenditure 
limit in Albuquerque are no different than the interests that were in-
sufficient in Buckley; therefore, the court found the limit must fai1. 257 
In another recent case, the Supreme Court indicated that campaign 
spending limits are still invalid under the Court's decision in Buckley, 
noting that "Later cases have respected this line between contributing 
and spending. "258 In Vermont, a district court did a thorough analysis 
of the state's public funding statute, finding, among other things, that 
the statute's expenditure limits were unconstitutiona1.259 The district 
court noted that "Buckley set an extremely high constitutional 
threshold for expenditure limits .... "260 
Some commentators express the view that spending caps would 
not help challengers and are nothing more than incumbent protec-
tion devices.261 Others espouse the opposite view, noting that caps on 
spending might help challengers and therefore hope the Court re-
considers Buckley to allow for the imposition of such caps.262 Although 
257 Id. at *8, *11. 
258 SeeFEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2356 (2001). 
259 Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 483 (D. Vt. 2000). 
260 Id. at 481. 
261 BURRELL, supra note 10, at 188 (claiming that "ceilings on spending and methods 
of raising money hurt challengers and advantage incumbents"); MALBIN & GAlS, supra 
note 198, at 144; Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 
170 (including Bob Peck, associated with the American Civil Liberties Union, who notes 
that those who support spending limits assume "people are sheep, who are attracted to 
whoever spends the most money," and calls such "reform" a way to decrease accountabil-
ity); Revolutionizing Campaign Finance, supra note 120, at 178 (including an address by Ste-
ven F. Stockmeyer, former executive director of the National Association of Business Politi-
cal Action Committees, saying that there is no evidence such caps would work in 
congressional elections); Smith, supra note 250, at 605 (noting that a flat spending cap 
may "harm those challengers most likely to actually defeat an incumbent" because the best 
challengers tend to have the most funding); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 
1152 (quoting former Senator Robert Dole, R-Kan., as saying "As I have said many, many 
times before, an absolute-fixed-cap on campaign spending is nothing more than a pre-
scription for incumbency protection."). 
262 See Klarman, supra note 250, at 538 n.218. The author notes, "For those of us who 
believe that unlimited campaign spending generally benefits incumbents more than chal-
lengers, the one useful step the Court might take in this area is to overrule its ghastly deci-
sion in Buckley, which constitutionally entrenches incumbents .... " Id.; Lieberman, supra 
note 250, at 462. Former Democratic vice presidential nominee and current Connecticut 
Senator Joseph Lieberman notes there are a number of things reformers can do, including 
asking the Court to reconsider Buckley by showing the "detrimental impact the unlimited 
spending they permitted ... [has] had on our campaign system." Lieberman, supra note 
250, at 462. Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, when responding to critics who say public 
financing and spending limits would protect incumbents, note that "it is the current un-
limited spending system that is the ultimate protection scheme for incumbents." 
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some language in recent cases has indicated that the Court may be a 
little closer to reconsidering Buckley, other cases have questioned the 
practical impact of the Supreme Court language.263 However, al-
though minority candidates in particular would seem to benefit from 
spending caps because these candidates tend to collect fewer cam-
paign contributions, these caps on their own would not help minority 
or female candidates because they would not help challengers in the 
one area where they need the most support: Fundraising.264 In addi-
tion, mandatory campaign spending caps appear as though they 
would face stiff constitutional scrutiny under the Court's Buckley 
analysis.265 However, there is a plan that could include spending limits 
and meet constitutional scrutiny: Public financing. 
E. The Most Far-Reaching Approach: Public Financing 
The Supreme Court, in a footnote within the lengthy Buckley de-
cision, laid out what may be the most promising form of campaign 
finance reform.266 While declaring limits on campaign expenditures 
unconstitutional, the Court noted: 
Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1152. Van Der Werf describes spending 
limits as having been "advocated for years as a way to even the advantage incumbents have 
.... " Van Der Werf, supra note 3, at AI. 
263 Colo. Republican, 121 S. Ct. at 2360 n.B. Although the FEC did not ask the Court to 
reconsider the expenditure limits approach in Buckky, the majority opinion, joined by five 
justices, notes in a footnote that "such limits could be justified in light of post-Buckley de-
velopments in campaign finance." Id. In addition, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri states that there could be a scheme with some limits on expenditures that 
would meet constitutional scrutiny, and Justice Breyer notes in his dissent that Buckky and 
its expenditure limits ruling could be reconsidered. Nixon, 52B U.S. at 405, 409. This 
would seem to indicate that several justices, perhaps a majority, are willing to reconsider 
Buckky. See id.; Colo. Republican, 121 S. Ct. at 2360 n.B. However, the Tenth Circuit noted 
recently that although "The district court also perceived that the Supreme Court currently 
was divided over Buckley's scope ... the statements [questioning Buckky] are not those of 
a majority even if joined by other members of the Court." Homans, No. 01-2271, at B. The 
Tenth Circuit also noted that "the Supreme Court has not suggested that the distinction 
between campaign expenditures and campaign contributions is about to change." Id. at 9. 
See generally Buckky, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
264 See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 21,60 (1999) (drawing the conclusion that "Women, African Americans, 
Latinos and other disproportionately poor groups near the bottom of the social structure 
have less political power in an electoral system in which voice and power can be purchased 
than they would in a system with public financing of campaigns, stringent spending limits, 
and free media time .... "); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 63, at 279 n.26; Copeland, supra 
note 57, at 20. 
263 See Colo. Republican, 121 S. Ct. at 2356; Buckky, 424 U.S. at 19,143; Homans, No. 01-
2271, at 10-11. 
266 Buckky, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65. 
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[C]ongress may engage in public financing of election cam-
paigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an 
agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expendi-
ture limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the 
size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide 
to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding. 267 
With this small notation, the Court left the door open to allow public 
funding of campaigns to trickle down from the current publicly 
funded presidential election process to congressional campaigns.268 
Public funding plans can take on many different forms, ranging 
from full funding to smaller proposals to provide free air time to 
qualifying candidates.269 Even the older form of the McCain-Feingold 
bill included public-funding elements that have since been stripped 
from the legislation.27o Although there is some variation, public-
funding proposals can be broken into four general categories. The 
first category is the lowest rung of public funding: Providing free air 
time to qualifying candidates.271 Supporters argue that free communi-
cation vouchers are essential to reform because television is very im-
portant to elections, television advertising comes with a very large 
price tag, and proposals including free television time are workable 
because the public owns the airwaves. 272 Proposals vary in form, 
mainly by the length of air time each candidate would receive, but the 
premise behind the idea is the same: Because advertising is the quick-
267Id. 
268 See id.; 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (2000). 
269 See HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164-65; Blasi, supra note 250, at 1318-19; 
Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New HOIizon fur Campaign Finance Reform, 37 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 307, 317-22 (2000) ;Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative 
and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1160, 1189-
1202 (1994) [hereinafter The Constitutional Imperative]; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra 
note 117, at 1149-54. 
270 See S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164-65. The 
authors list the elements of the older McCain-Feingold legislation, noting that the bill 
included: Voluntary spending limits ranging from $1.5 million to $8.25 million in the Sen-
ate and $600,000 per election in the House; thirty minutes of free, prime-time television 
on stations in their state for complying candidates; the ability for House and Senate candi-
dates to purchase advertising time at 50% of the lowest rate; and mailing benefits for com-
plying candidates. See HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164-65. 
271 See HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164-65; PRICE, supra note 48, at 27; Blasi, 
supra note 250, at 1318-19. Wertheimer & Weiss Manes encourage limited amounts of free 
television time through the use of vouchers, citing the fact that "Television is the most 
powerful means of communication in our society and plays a critical role in our national 
elections." Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1151. 
272 Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1151-52. 
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est and most expensive means with which to reach the public, candi-
dates should be given an easy way to tap into this medium.273 
The intermediate level includes proposals that include a certain 
amount of public funding short of full public financing. 274 Such pro-
posals could include a "floor" of public funds in which the govern-
ment would match smaller donations through an expansion of the tax 
check off system, or a system in which the government would ensure a 
candidate was not at a substantial disadvantage against his or her op-
ponent.275 
The next level involves providing public money to fully fund 
campaigns, a proposal that can and often does include some form of 
reduced or free television/radio air time.276 The typical full public 
funding proposal first makes the program voluntary so as to comply 
with Buckley.277 In addition, in order to quality as publicly funded can-
didates, a candidate would need to show a minimum level of support 
by collecting a certain number of relatively small qualifYing contribu-
tions.278 Once a candidate has qualified to receive public funds and 
273 See HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164--65 (outlining a former version of the 
McCain-Feingold bill that offers participating Senate candidates thirty minutes of free, 
prime-time television on stations in their state, and House and Senate candidates could 
also purchase advertising time at 50% of the lowest rate); Marty Jezer et aI., A Proposal for 
Democratically Financed Congressional Ekctions, 11 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 333, 345, 349-51, 
354-59 (1993) (endorsing a plan by The Working Group on Electoral Democracy that 
would give a House candidate fifteen minutes for the primary and thirty minutes for the 
general election and thirty minutes to each Senate candidate during the primary and sixty 
minutes for the general campaign, all in one to five minute slots); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra 
note 269, at 1196-97 (1994) (endorsing The Working Group on Electoral Democracy's 
proposal); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1151-52; Curran, supra note 3 
(explaining that Clinton's 1993 campaign finance proposal included a $600,000 voluntary 
spending cap for House candidates who would receive up to $200,000 in "communication 
vouchers" to be used to buy print and broadcast advertising.) 
274 PRICE, supra note 48, at 27. 
275 [d.; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1412 (admitting that a system in which the govern-
ment ensures a candidate is not at a substantial disadvantage has numerous problems in-
cluding who would qualifY and what would prevent candidates from being unfairly ex-
cluded). 
276 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 317-22; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 
1189-1202; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1149-54. 
277 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 318; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1191; 
Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1149. 
278 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 318 (requiring $20,000 raised in $100 increments 
to qualifY); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1190 (requiring 1000 $5 contributions for 
House candidates and 2000 $5 contributions for Senate candidates in states with one 
House district, and an additional 250 per district); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 
117, at 1149 (requiring qualifying contributions, but leaving out the details of the number 
and amount of those qualifYing contributions). 
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has pledged not to campaign for private dollars, that candidate would 
then receive payments based on her specific Senate or House race.279 
Proposals for full financing also can include a number of other ele-
ments, including a provision that provides publicly funded candidates 
with additional money if their opponent spends over a predetermined 
amount and a provision that addresses independent expenditures by 
non-candidate groups and individuals. 280 
Finally, the most radical and therefore least politically viable op-
tion involves creating a voucher system to replace our current 
financing mechanism.281 In general, a voucher proposal would give 
each voter campaign vouchers that could be used to fund political 
campaigns.282 In addition, with limited exceptions, only vouchers 
could be used to fund campaigns.283 Despite some benefits, even sup-
porters admit that it is a long road towards enacting such a far-
reaching reform. 284 
Based on evidence from the states, it appears as though the most 
viable reform is a full-financing system that includes many of the ele-
279 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 318 (charging the FEC with setting the amount of 
public funding for candidates based on various aspects of the district or state); Raskin & 
Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1190-92 (listing specific dollar amounts for House and Senate 
candidates including House candidates receiving $100,000 in the primary and an addi-
tional $150,000 for the general campaign and Senate candidates receiving $100,000 for the 
primary plus $50,000 for each congressional district, and $150,000 for the general cam-
paign plus $75,000 for each additional congressional district all in exchange for an agree-
ment the candidate would not raise or private money during the primary and general 
election); Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1149 (explaining a proposal 
could use either a matching formula which would lead to a partial publicly-funded system 
like presidential primaries, or a grant system that would give candidate full financing like 
the general presidential election). 
280 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 319-20; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 
1198-99; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1150. 
281 Bruce A. Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM. 
PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 71; Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitar-
ian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1,5,44 (1996); Sun-
stein, supra note 53, at 1412-13. 
282 Ackerman, supra note 281, at 71 (explaining that each registered voter would get a 
balance of "red-white-and-blue money" or vouchers that would be the only source of fund-
ing to pay for elections); Hasen, supra note 281, at 22 (noting that voters could use the 
vouchers to fund candidates, licensed interest groups or political parties); Sunstein, supra 
note 53, at 1412. 
283 Ackerman, supra note 281, at 71; Hasen, supra note 281, at 5; Sunstein, supra note 
53, at 1412. 
284 Hasen, supra note 281, at 44 (noting that although the Supreme Court should find 
such a proposal constitutional, "such an outcome is far from certain"). 
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ments listed above.285 Several states, including Arizona, Maine, Massa-
chusetts and Vermont, have passed so-called "clean election" laws that 
implement public financing for offices within the state.286 Although 
the clean elections laws in the four states share many different ele-
ments, Maine's law is perhaps the most helpful in understanding the 
structure of a sound public-funding system because it has withstood a 
challenge in federal court and has already been tested in an elec-
tion.287 
IV. A POSITIVE EXPERIMENT FROM THE STATES AND THE 
LIMITATIONS OF POLITICS 
A. As Goes Maine, so Goes the Country? 
The Maine Clean Election Act was a 1996 ballot initiative that was 
approved by over ten percentage points.288 The law, which went into 
effect for the 2000 election, involves public funding for Governor, 
State Senator, and State Representative races. 289 Candidates must de-
clare their intention to be certified, agree not to exceed certain limits 
when collecting "seed money," and obtain a certain number of quali-
285 See Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 317-22; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 
1189-1202; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1149-54; Carey Goldberg, Pub-
licly Paid Elections Put to the Test in 3 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, § 1, at 44; Hungry for 
Good News About the Election? 7'ry This, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2000, at 24A [hereinafter Hungry 
for Good News]; Rick Klein, Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
26,2001, at A1;Josh Silver, Reform Effort Likely to Miss; Priorities: As Congress Studies the Lan-
guishing Bill to Reform Campaign Finance, Loopholes in the Legislation May Prevent Even a Passed 
Versionfrom Staying True to the Cause, BALT. SUN,Jan. 21, 2001, at 1C. 
286 Az. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1121 (2000); 
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55A, § 1 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (2000); Robert 
Dreyfuss, Reform Beyond the Beltway; States as Laboratories of Clean Money, AM. PROSPECT, May-
June 1998, at 50 (noting that Maine's clean elections passed by a margin of 56 to 44% on 
November 5, 1996); Robert Dreyfuss, Reform Gets Rolling; Campaign Finance at the Grass 
Roots, AM. PROSPECT,July-Aug. 1999, at 39 (noting that the measure in Vermont was passed 
by the state legislature in 1997; the measure in Massachusetts garnered 67% of the vote in 
1998; and the measure in Arizona, a conservative state, was passed by the voters by 51 % to 
49% in 1998). See Rick Klein, Clean Elections Concessions Offers May Not Save Funding Bill, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2001, at B5 [hereinafter Clean Elections Concessions]. Klein notes 
that actual funding for clean elections in Massachusetts has stalled. Id. See Section lYB. 
287 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §§ 1121-1128 (2000); Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't 
Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000); CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105 at 373; Hungry for Good News, supra note 285, at 24A. 
288 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 105, at 373; Ford & Levien, 
supra note 269, at 314; Dreyfuss, Reform Beyond the Beltway, supra note 286, at 50. 
289 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1123 (2000). 
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fying contributions during the qualifying period.290 Once the candi-
date has been certified and transferred all collected money to the 
Maine Clean Election Fund, a candidate can only spend money from 
the Fund and may not accept any contributions unless authorized.291 
The Fund, financed through a number of methods including a tax 
check-off program and revenue from other taxes, disperses money 
based on the average of the last two elections.292 The law also includes 
a provision that provides clean election candidates with additional 
money if their non-clean election opponent exceeds the distribution 
amount proscribed for clean candidates.293 A candidate must return 
any unused money, and a candidate who has been denied certification 
can appeal the decision through a proscribed method.294 The Com-
mission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices will prepare a 
report that documents, evaluates, and recommends changes by Janu-
ary 30, 2002, and every four years after that date.295 In addition, in 
conjunction with the clean elections law, Maine also lowered contri-
butions from an individual, political committee, other committee, 
corporation or association to $500 for gubernatorial candidates and 
$250 for all other candidates.296 
290 Id. § 1125 (1)-(3). Seed money cannot exceed $50,000 for gubernatorial candi-
dates, $1500 for State Senate candidates and $500 for State House of Representatives can-
didate. § 1125 (2) (A)-(C). For gubernatorial candidates to qualify, 2500 verified registered 
voters must give a qualifying contribution, defined as $5 in the form of check or money 
order; a State Senate candidate must collect 150 such contributions; and a House candi-
date must collect fifty such contributions. §§ 1122(7), 1125(3). 
291 § 1125(5)-(6). 
292 §§ 1124-1125(7), (8)(A)-(C). The Fund disperses money based on the specific 
type of election: contested primaries, uncontested primaries, and contested general elec-
tions. Id. Revenues may not be expended for uncontested general elections. § 1125 
(8)(D). 
Id. 
293 21-A M.R.S. § 1125(9). Matching funds can be triggered if a: 
[Flinance or election report shows that the sum of a candidate's expenditures 
or obligations, or funds raised or borrowed, whichever is greater, alone or in 
conjunction with independent expenditures reported under section 1019, 
exceeds the distribution amount under subsection 8, the commission shall is-
sue immediately to any opposing Maine Clean Election Act candidate an ad-
ditional amount equivalent to the reported excess. Matching funds are lim-
ited to 2 times the amount originally distributed under subsection 8, 
paragraph A or C, whichever is applicable. 
294Id. § 1125(13)-(14). 
295Id. §§ 1122(2), 1128. 
296 Id. §§ 1015(1)-(2), 1056(1). 
2002] Campaign Finance Reform and Minority Candidates 147 
In Daggett v. Commission on Gov't Ethics & Election Practices, a long 
list of plaintiffs challenged Maine's new funding mechanism, arguing 
that the public funding mechanism unconstitutionally coerced candi-
dates to participate, and that the contribution limits violated the First 
Amendment.297 The First Circuit concluded that the contribution lim-
its of the State Representatives and Senators are constitutional and 
the public funding scheme does not violate the First Amendment, 
thereby upholding the ACt. 29B The court, in evaluating whether or not 
the system is so stacked towards participation as to be deemed coer-
cive-and therefore unconstitutional-held that "Maine's public 
financing scheme provides a roughly proportionate mix of benefits 
and detriments to candidates seeking public funding, such that it 
does not burden the First Amendment rights of candidates or con-
tributors. "299 In short, Maine's law, while perhaps not perfect, is a 
good model with which to craft other full-funding systems. 300 
Despite Maine's success, full public funding does not lack crit-
ics.301 Some critics indicate the public does not support full public 
congressional funding, others claim giving additional money once an 
opponent exceeds a certain level is unconstitutional, while others 
note that such a system would do little for equality or corruption.302 
However, it is not difficult to find support for full public financing 
from female and minority activists; in fact, many see this as the best 
possibility for real reform.303 In Maine, numerous groups joined the 
fight for full public funding, including the Maine Women's Lobby 
and the NAACP, further evidence that public funding would be a 
positive development for minorities and women.304 Those looking to 
put more women into office need only look to the results of Maine's 
297 Daggett, 205 F.3d at 450. The plaintiffs included legislative candidates, campaign 
contributors, political action committees, and the Maine Libertarian Party. ld. 
298 ld. at 472. The First Circuit did not rule on the $500 limit to gubernatorial candi-
dates, finding that none of the parties in the suit had standing on that issue. ld. 
mId. 
300 See generally id. 
301 HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 168-70;Joseph E. Finley, The Pitfalls of Contin-
gent Public Financing in Congressional Campaign Spending R£form, 44 EMORY LJ. 735, 739-40 
(1995) (addressing the constitutionality of contingent public funding which is like Maine's 
matching program, in that the candidate receives extra money if their opponent exceeds a 
certain level); Smith, supra note 250, at 592. 
302 HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 168-70; Finley, supra note 301, at 739-40; 
Smith, supra note 250, at 610-24. 
303 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 48; Constitutional Implica-
tions of Campaign Finance R£form, supra note 250, at 197; Malcolm, supra note 172, at A23. 
304 See Dreyfuss, Reform Beyond the Beltway, supra note 286, at 50. 
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first election under the clean elections laws to find heartening evi-
dence of success.305 After passing clean election reform, the number 
of candidates seeking a Maine House or Senate seat went from 305 in 
1998 to 352 in 2000; of the 352, 116 candidates ran under the clean 
election system.306 In addition, 54% of those running under clean 
election won (sixty-two candidates including thirty-seven incum-
bents), and more women ran than usuaI.3°7 
Problems did occur during the 2000 election in Maine.308 Interest 
groups spent more on issue advertising, overly complex reporting re-
quirements may have deterred some candidates, and non-clean can-
didates delayed reporting expenditures so clean candidates would not 
get their matching funding right away.309 Overall, however, "most 
agree in Maine that while the Clean Elections Act will be revised be-
fore 2002, it's there to stay."310 Public financing would at least level the 
playing field for challengers and encourage new faces to enter the 
political ring; because of women's tendency to fall into that category, 
full funding would be a positive reform for female candidates.311 
The same is true for minority candidates, a group that has ex-
pressed the most desire for full public funding. 312 Many minority activ-
ists have encouraged a full-funding system; numerous civil rights 
groups have called for such a system, and a black congressman, Har-
old E. Ford, Jr., D-Tenn., has written an article advocating such a 
change.313 In July 2001, the NAACP adopted a resolution calling cam-
305 Goldberg, supra note 285, at 44; Hungry for Good News, supra note 285, at 24A; Klein, 
Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra note 285, at AI; Silver, supra note 285, at 1 C. 
306 Klein, Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra note 285, at AI. 
307 Goldberg, supra note 285, at 44; Hungry for Good News, supra note 285, at 24A; Klein, 
Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra note 285, at AI; Silver, supra note 285, at 1 C. 
In addition, more than 10,000 Maine residents made $5 contributions to candidates, 
spending on legislative races went down by 18%, and the disparity of funding between 
winners and losers "leveled off 'significantly.'" Emmet Meara, Maine's Clean Elections Called 
'Best System in the Nation', BANGOR DAILY NEws,June 15, 2001, at B4. 
308 See Klein, Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra note 285, at AI. 
309 Id. 
31°Id. 
3ll See Id.; Malcolm, supra note 172, at A23. 
312 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 48; Constitutional Implica-
tions of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 197. 
313 Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 48 (including remarks by 
professor and journalist Roger Wilkins, who noted "And if you want to really equalize it, 
say nobody can give any money except we the people. So we'll have public financing of 
campaigns. That seems to me to gets closer to one person, one vote than anything I 
know. "); Challenging the Campaign Finance System as a Voting Rights Barrier: A Legal Strategy, 43 
How. LJ. 63, 73 (1999) (including a speech by civil rights activist Dr. Gwen Patton who 
explained "If we truly want to see a democratic society, we have to complete the unfinished 
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paign finance reform a civil rights issue and supporting full public 
funding. 314 Professor Raskin has said that public funding would be 
helpful to black candidates because, "It is precisely people who come 
from the poor communities who would benefit from public financing 
of elections."315 In short, minority candidates would benefit from such 
a system because it would erase the historical fundraising disparity 
between minority and white candidates.316 As Warren Tolman, a 2002 
Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate and clean money proponent, 
explains, "The reason why the clean elections movement is a threat to 
the political establishment is precisely its appeal: it levels the playing 
field and opens the door of electoral politics to real working men and 
women, more minorities, and more women .... "317 
B. Don't Under-Estimate Politics 
If election reformers' only prerogative was to increase the num-
ber of minority and female members in the House and Senate, there 
are more radical, non-finance related approaches that could easily 
accomplish that goaJ.318 However, one key element with which any re-
business of the voting rights movement where the vote, not money, is the only determinant 
in the process. That means public financing for all political campaigns. There can be no 
compromise; no zigzag."); Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 
2S0, at 183 (including a panel with American University professor Jamin Raskin who ex-
plained that a "superior alternative" to a private money system is public financing of elec-
tions); Continuing to Build a Movement; Legal and Grassroots Strategies, 43 How. LJ. 87, 99 
(1999) (including a panel with Randall Kehler, formerly associated with Public Campaign, 
who explains that, "the solution has to be, in some way, shape or form, publicly financed 
elections."); Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 317-22; (including a plan for voluntary full 
public financing); Marcella Bombardieri, Campaign 2000; Quiet Refarmer Activist Takes New 
Tack Against Big Money in Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2000, at Bl (noting that John C. 
Bonifaz, founder of the National Voting Rights Institute, prefers a fully publicly funded 
system); National Digest, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 13, 1999, at 4 (noting that the 
National Voting Rights Institute, the NAACP and other civil rights groups argue "public 
financing would help level the playing field for candidates who might be long on vision 
and ability but short n funding"); Press Release, Fannie Lou Hamer Project, NAACP En-
darses Public Financing of Elections ''Fannie Lou Hamer Would Be Proud" (July 11, 2001), at 
http://www.f1hp.org/naacppressl.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter NAACP 
Endarses Public Financing] . 
314 NAACP Endarses Public Financing, supra note 313. 
315 ConstitutionalImplications of Campaign Finance Refarm, supra note 2S0, at 197. 
316 See id.; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 1, at 19. 
317 Warren Tolman, Cleaning Up Elections in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 2000, 
atAlS. 
318 SeeH.R. 1189, 107th Congo (2001) (sponsored by Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney, D-Ga., 
allowing states to create multi-seat congressional districts); H.R. 3068, 10Sth Congo (1997) 
(a predecessor to H.R. 1189 also sponsored by McKinney along with thirteen co-sponsors, 
including nine black representatives); Becker, supra note 264, at 79-80 (outlining three 
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form must contend is the politics of getting a particular piece of legis-
lation passed.319 
As University of Virginia Professor Michael J. Klarman explains, 
commentators may disagree about the benefits and harms of certain 
reform, but ''The one thing that virtually all commentators agree 
upon, though, is that legislators drafting campaign finance legislation 
will seek to enhance the advantages of incumbency. "320 One need only 
look at past campaign finance fights to get an idea of the range of self-
interests present.321 During the 1993 fight over President Clinton's 
campaign finance legislation, a time when Democrats controlled the 
White House, Senate and House, different factions torpedoed any 
reform.322 As Capitol Hill's newspaper Roll Call explained, up to four 
different constituencies in the House considered "portions of the bill 
to be threats to their own political futures, and they appear willing to 
scuttle the legislation in its current form. "323 
Others argue that campaign finance reform is so complicated in 
its specifics and politics that action or inaction is difficult to under-
stand.324 Indeed, because incumbents do not like passing legislation 
proposals ranging in feasibility: a multi-member district scheme for the Senate, a constitu-
tional amendment creating the regional election of senators, and a requirement that each 
state send at least one woman to the Senate); Suzanne Daley, French Parties Press for Women 
in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, § 1, at 8 (outlining a new law passed in France last year 
that, starting with municipal elections this past March, political parties are obliged to have 
an equal number of male and female candidates in almost all elections, a law that "appears 
to go further than any other in the world in attempting to share representation more 
evenly between men and women"). 
319 See Klarman, supra note 250, at 536-37; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1400; Gail 
Collins, Campaign Finance 101, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A23; Michelle Cottle, Where Are 
the Good Guys When We Need Them? While the Public Interest Groups Fiddle, Campaign Finance 
RejormBurns, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1997, at 20; Curran, supra note 3. 
320 See Klarman, supra note 250, at 536-37; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1400. 
321 See Cottle, supra note 319, at 20; Curran, supra note 3. 
322 See Curran, supra note 3. 
323 Id. The author explains that four Democratic constituencies, Southern conserva-
tives, minorities, liberal reformers and women, all had different problems with Clinton's 
1993 campaign finance legislation. [d. Southern conservatives did not like provisions in-
cluding some public funding, minority members did not like some PAC and soft money 
elements of the bill, women opposed the anti-bundling provision, and liberals complained 
the bill did not go far enough. Id. 
524 See Collins, Campaign Finance 101, supra note 319, at A23. Collins explains the poli-
tics over the McCain-Feingold legislation in 2001: 
Sometime this month, the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill is 
going to come up in the Senate. Its supporters have the votes to win, in the-
ory. But there are pitfalls. A theoretically sympathetic senator could offer an 
amendment that eases the rules for unions, or Emily's List, or the Christian 
Coalition, and suddenly-poison pilll-tlle whole fragile coalition of support 
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that would endanger their own electoral safety, it appears as though 
politics has whittled down the most touted reform proposal, the 
McCain-Feingold bill.325 The legislation, although it finally passed the 
Senate in 2001, has been reduced to an acceptable, and weaker, ma-
jority-friendly bill, much removed from its 1997 form.326 In addition, 
politicians generally do not face a great deal of constituent pressure 
to pass campaign finance reform and instead choose to focus on more 
popular issues.327 Politics impacted the most recent attempt at chang-
ing campaign finance law.328 Mter the Senate passed the McCain-
Feingold bill, the House was slated to debate and vote on that body's 
companion measure, the Shays-Meehan bill.329 However, even before 
debate could begin, a procedural maneuver by those opposed to the 
cracks. And when people read about it the next day, looking to see whom they 
ought to blame, they'll see a phrase like "express advocacy" or "coordinated 
expenditure restrictions" and find their eyes sliding over to the weather re-
port. There are senators committed to voting for the bill who would secretly 
like to see it die. 
Id. And ultimately, at least in 2001, it appears as though Collins's remarks have proven to 
be prophetic: The House version of McCain-Feingold stalled in that chamber initially be-
cause of an anti-reform procedural maneuver. See Alison Mitchell, Campaign Measure 
Shelved After Fierce Fight on Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Campaign 
Measure Shelved]. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 further sidelined the meas-
ure. See David S. Broder, Some Action on Hill Delayed to Avoid Divisive Debates, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 24, 2001, at AI. However, the collapse of Enron, a company that donated a 
significant amount of money to both political parties, brought the measure back to life in 
early 2002. See Alison Mitchell, Enron s Woes Revive Debate on Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2002, atAI6 [hereinafter Enron's Woes]. 
525 See Silver, supra note 285, at IC. Silver explains that "the original legislation has 
been gutted," having lost provisions involving bundling and free air time, leaving the bill 
"riddled with loopholes." Id. 
526 See S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, at 164-65. The 
authors list the elements of the older McCain-Feingold legislation, noting that the bill 
included voluntary spending limits ranging from $1.5 million to $8.25 million in the Sen-
ate and $600,000 per election in the House, and in return offered complying candidates 
thirty minutes of free, prime-time television on stations in their state, and House and Sen-
ate candidates could also purchase advertising time at 50% of the lowest rate; also, the bill 
included mailing benefits for complying candidates. See HREBENAR, ET AL., supra note 194, 
at 164-65; Silver, supra note 285, at IC. The bill that passed the Senate does not contain 
any of these provisions. SeeS. 27, 107th Congo (2001); Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes 
in Senate, supra note 5, at AI. 
527 See Van Dongen & Keller, supra note 2. The authors explain that, "most strategists 
believe that the issue doesn't have much political bite." Id. 
528 Alison Mitchell, 2 Groups in House Are at Focal Point on Campaign Bil~ N.Y. TIMES,July 
12,2001, at Al (noting that "two pivotal groups" were at the center of the future of reform, 
"Republican freshman and black Democrats. ") 
529 See Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate, supra note 5, at AI. Months be-
fore the House began debate on Shays-Meehan, House Majority Whip Rep. Tom Delay, R-
Tex., vowed to "'try anything I can' to kill it." Id. 
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legislation forced the proponents to vote down the rules for debate 
and therefore postpone a vote on the measure.330 Although, the ter-
rorist attack on September 11 dimmed prospects for reform in 2001, 
the collapse of Enron enhanced the chances for a floor debate in 
2002.331 
Despite the fact that public funding reformers in Arizona, Maine, 
Massachusetts and Vermont were successful, and polls show public 
financing support at 60 to 80%, recent public-financing efforts in Mis-
souri and Oregon during the 2000 election failed by sizable margins, 
indicating support for this kind of reform may not be as broad as 
supporters would like.332 In addition, despite the fact that Massachu-
setts voters approved clean elections in a 1998 ballot initiative, politics 
is getting in the way of actually funding the measure.!!33 The battle 
over clean elections made its way to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court in December 2001, where the justices were critical of the 
legislature's refusal to fund the initiative, but conflicted over the 
5l1O See Mitchell, Campaign Measure Shelved, supra note 324, at AI. House leaders insisted 
that sponsors of the bill would have to introduce each of the minor changes to their bill in 
a separate measure, fourteen in all, rather than allowing them to put forward one package. 
Id. Supporters of the legislation felt this was too difficult and therefore told supporters to 
vote down the rules, therefore postponing taking up the issue. Id. Opponents had already 
tried to avoid passing the Shays-Meehan bill by backing a measure by Rep. Bob Ney, R-
Ohio, that allowed contributors to give up to $75,000 a year to each of the six national 
political committees and allowed unlimited contributions to state parties. Id. 
m See Broder, supra note 324, at AI; Amy Keller, Election Reform Efforts Expected to Move 
Forward, ROLL CALL (D.C.), Sept. 24, 2001. Following the failure of bringing debate on 
Shays-Meehan, proponents were collecting signatures for a petition to force the House 
leadership to bring the issue on to the calendar. See Broder, supra note 324, at AI. Sup-
porters had collected 210 of 218 needed signatures before the terrorist attack. [d. The 
signature drive stopped after the attack and many questioned whether or not the issue 
would reappear on the agenda because of more pressing national concerns. See id.; Keller, 
supra. However, when Enron collapsed, the media focused on the company's significant 
campaign donations and political access, whereby re-igniting the drive for reform. See 
Mitchell, Enron's Woes, supra note 324. As a result, by January 21, supporters expected to 
pick up the signatures they needed to force the House leadership to schedule a floor de-
bate. See id. 
552 See Dreyfuss, Reform Gets Rolling, supra note 286, at 39; Terry Ganey, Missourians ~ 
ject Public Financing of Election Campaigns; Proposal to Restrict BiUboards Appeared to Pass, ST. 
LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at A15 (explaining that the ballot initiative, which 
failed by a 2-1 margin, was "a target for business organizations like the Chamber of Com-
merce and Associated Industries of Missouri" because it would have been funded through 
a corporate franchise tax on 7500 employers); The Measures, OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 2000, at 
C4 (listing a ballot initiative, public money for candidates, as going down to defeat with 
60% voting against the proposal). 
m Klein, Clean Elections Concessions, supra note 286, at B5. 
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court's power to impose a remedy.334 In short, if the House is having 
problems passing Shays-Meehan, which includes modest reform, the 
prospects for an entirely new federal public funding mechanism is 
daunting at best.335 As Representative Martin T. Meehan, D-Mass., has 
said, "Members are not going to change a system that benefits them 
unless they feel they have no choice. "336 
V. THE BEST AND THE WORST CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM HAS TO OFFER 
Campaign finance reform proposals fall into three general cate-
gories: smaller efforts that could make some difference to minority 
and female candidates, larger, more beneficial proposals, and propos-
als that would be detrimental to these groupS.337 While any reform 
proposal will have to go through the congressional ringer, it is essen-
tial that reformers remember that actions that seem to improve the 
way Americans elect their politicians could come at a cost-even less 
diversity than we currently have.338 
There are "reforms" that if passed could have a serious impact on 
minority and female candidates.339 Proposals that ban PAC contribu-
3M Rick Klein,Justices Hit Lawmakers on Clean Elections, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2001, at 
BI. As of January 22, 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court had not yet ruled on the fate of 
clean elections in Massachusetts. 
335 See O'CONNOR & SABATO (3d ed. 1998), supra note 5, at 375; Mitchell, Campaign 
Measure Shelved, supra note 324, at AI. O'Connor and Sabato explain that although cam-
paign finance reform is a "favorite Washington topic ... little legislation is ever passed." See 
O'CoNNOR & SABATO (3d ed. 1998), supra note 5, at 375. 
336 Adam Clymer, Many Proposals, Few Supporters, On Campaign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
1997, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Many Proposals] (quoting Meehan). 
337 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129, 146; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608,617; Becker, supra note 264, 
at 79-80; Briffault, supra note 179, at 660-61; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra 
note 236, at 46-47 (1999); Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 317-22; In-Kind Donations to 
Political Campaigns, supra note 143, at 34; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 63, at 279 n.26; 
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1189-1202; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 
117, at 1135, 1149-54; Clymer, Many Proposals, supra note 336, at 1; Curran, supra note 3; 
Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Lewis, supra note 143, at A25; Pruitt, supra note 236, at 4E; 
Schwinn, supra note 143, at AIO; Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. 
336 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1390, 1409-10; Clymer, Many Proposals, supra note 
336, at 1. 
S39 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129, 146; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608, 617; Becker, supra note 264, 
at 79-80; Briffault, supra note 179, at 660-61; Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, supra 
note 236, at 46-47 (1999); In-Kind Donations to Political Campaigns, supra note 143, at 34; 
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tions or reduce the amount they could contribute would be detrimen-
tal, as would proposals that would eliminate the practice of bundling 
without some protection for groups like EMILYs List.340 Reducing the 
power or fundraising capabilities of political parties would hurt chal-
lengers generally, and minority and female candidates in particular.341 
Therefore, a ban on soft money, without a way for national parties to 
make up the loss in contributions, could negatively impact minority 
and female candidates.342 In addition, proposals to raise the individual 
contribution limit alone would do little to aid challengers and would 
harm minorities.343 Any proposal that just puts a spending cap without 
additional measures to help challenger candidates would not be very 
beneficial because it would not help with fundraising, the most essen-
tial element to any challenger's campaign.344 Finally, in analyzing a 
package of reform, the McCain-Feingold legislation that passed the 
Senate in 2001 may wind up doing exactly what minority and female 
candidates need the least-help keep entrenched incumbents in their 
current positions.345 The bill's combination of abolishing soft money, 
increasing contribution limits and other measures like allowing can-
didates to spend more against wealthy opponents equals an incum-
bent-friendly piece of legislation.346 In addition, the protracted fight 
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 63, at 279 n.26; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, 
at 1135; Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Lewis, supra note 143, at A25; Pruitt, supra note 
236, at 4E; Schwinn, supra note 143, atA1O; Shanahan, supra note 71, at 9. 
340 In-Kind Donations to Political Campaigns, supra note 143, at 34; Wertheimer & Weiss 
Manes, supra note 117, at 1135; Friedman, supra note 143, at 50; Lewis, supra note 143, at 
A25; Schwinn, supra note 143, atA10; Shanahan, supra note 7l. 
341 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608,617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660-61. 
342 See HREBENAR ET AL., supra note 194, at 158; MALBIN & GAlS, supra note 198, at 
152-53; McGLEN & O'CONNOR, supra note 158, at 87; THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 
10, at 129; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 180, at 608, 617; Briffault, supra note 179, at 
660-6l. Despite evidence that suggests a soft money ban could be detrimental to minority 
and female candidates, the issue is not clear cut; some participants in the public debate 
have taken the opposite approach and support a ban on soft money. See The Purposes and 
Beneficiaries of Party "Soft Money': supra note 205; Memorandum to Congressional Black Caucus, 
supra note 223; Hosler, supra note 221, at AI. 
343 See THEILMANN AND WILHITE, supra note 10, at 146; Campaign Finance as a Civil 
Rights Issue, supra note 236, at 46-47 (1999); Pruitt, supra note 236, at 4E. 
344 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 63, at 279 n.26; Copeland, supra note 57, at 20 
(noting "Few challengers have the capacity to spend the amount of money necessary to 
beat an incumbent."). 
345 See Hook & McManus, supra note 238, at AI. 
346 [d. The authors note, "One outcome is clear: Abolishing soft money and relying en-
tirely on hard money favors incumbents, no matter what their party"; in addition, the Sen-
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regarding the House version of the McCain bill, Shays-Meehan, illus-
trates that some minority politicians are beginning to realize that the 
elements of these measures could hurt minority representation.347 Al-
though not all commentators and minority representatives agree, sev-
eral minority members of the House balked at several proposals in the 
Shays-Meehan bill that comply with the Senate version, including an 
increase in hard-money limits for Senate races and an all-out ban on 
soft money.348 Some minority members said a ban on soft money 
could undercut get-out-the-vote efforts including registration and 
mobilization.349 In short, while it is most likely not the intention of 
ate added "several other incumbent-friendly amendments." [d. Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-
Conn., has said that the amendment protecting candidates who face wealthy opponents is 
"pretty much incumbency protection." [d. Ultimately, the measures in McCain-Feingold, 
"are likely to make incumbent politicians even more powerful and secure than they are 
now." Thomma, sUfrra note 196, at G6. 
347 Fears, sufrra note 221, at AI; Hosler, sUfrra note 221, at Al (noting that up to half of 
Rep. Wynn's Congressional Black Caucus colleagues "appeared to be aligned with him" 
against the Shays-Meehan bill); Mitchell, Blacks and Hispanics in House Balk, sUfrra note 221, 
at AI; Mitchell, House G.O.P. Seeks New Way, sUfrra note 190, at AI. One possible reason why 
race was not as much of a factor in the Senate debate is because of the dismal representa-
tion of minority members in the Senate. See Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, sUfrra note 13, at 
3 (listing a total of thirty-nine black members elected to the 107th Congress, including 
thirty-5even black voting House members and two black non-voting House delegates). 
348 Fears, sUfrra note 221, at Al (noting that "The smaller Congressional Hispanic Cau-
cus issued a formal notice that it has major concerns regarding the Shays-Meehan bill 
.... "); Hosler, sUfrra note 221, at IA; Mitchell, Blacks and Hispanics in House, sufrra note 
221, atAI; Mitchell, House G.O.P. Seeks New Way, sUfrra note 190, atAI. Even some members 
of the Congressional Black Caucus who said they would vote for Shays-Meehan expressed 
some reservations: 
We do believe in campaign finance reform .... Soft money has been used to 
drown out the voices of our constituents and people like them across the 
country. But the question is whether a soft-money ban that takes money away 
from get-out-the-vote efforts is almost suicidal for the black caucus. 
Hosler, supra note 221, at IA (quoting Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, D-Md.). Dissenters to this 
logic argue that a ban on soft money would return politics to a more grass-roots approach 
and would increase the clout of poorer and minority districts by reducing the power of big-
money politics. See Donna Brazile, Soft Money's Scanty Leftovers, N.Y. TIMEs,July 11, 2001, at 
A17; Fears, sUfrra note 221, at AI. In fact, Rep. Wynn took criticism for his stance against 
Shays-Meehan and for c0-5ponsoring legislation with Rep. Ney that would limit but not 
completely ban soft money. See Hosler, supra note 221, at IA. Hosler notes, "Some of Rep. 
Albert R. Wynn's colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus say they are troubled, even 
angry, that he would work to defeat what they see as a crucial political reform." [d. 
349 Mitchell, Blacks and Hispanics in House, supra note 221, at AI. Some members said 
problems with black citizens voting in Florida during the 2000 election emphasized the 
need for voter mobilization efforts; Rep. Wynn, said "'Florida made all of us aware of what 
goes on at the street level, the need for voter registration for example." See id. In addition, 
another member noted "'If you take away the source of funding for the get-out-the-vote 
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reformers, legislation like McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan, could 
result in unintended consequences like reduced voter participation 
and weakened political parties.35o 
There are, however, small proposals that might be considered 
more politically feasible than a complete overhaul of the campaign 
finance system.351 Proposals that call for reduced or free media time 
for candidates in exchange for a spending cap, similar to the concept 
in Clinton's 1993 campaign finance bill, would help.352 Also, one of 
the components proposed in The Working Group on Electoral De-
mocracy's proposal for Democratically Financed Elections to Con-
gress, could greatly help minority candidates: campaign scholarships 
for poor or working people running for Congress.353 Through this 
proposal, a candidate who can demonstrate that she would be unable 
to support herself or her family during the campaign would receive a 
reasonable amount of money for living expenses. 354 
Small proposals, however, would lead to small results.355 To enact 
real reform, to truly give minorities and women the chance to reach 
parity in the United States Congress, full public financing needs to be 
enacted.356 Many commentators have proposed full public funding 
schemes that no doubt would help minority and female candidates.357 
campaign, you undercut the black community.'" See id. (quoting Rep. James E. Clyburn, D-
S.C.) 
350 See Thomma, supra note 196, at G6. Thomma warns about unforeseen results, and 
quotes Boston University History Professor Bruce Schulman as saying reform "'always has 
unintended consequences because people find creative ways to evade the rules.'" Id. 
Thomma notes that McCain-Feingold could limit the parties' ability to bring new voters to 
the polls, make parties more dependent on interest groups whereby giving them more 
clout, and make incumbents even more secure. See id. 
351 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1194; Curran, supra note 3. 
352 See Curran, supra note 3. 
353 SeeJezer, et aI., supra note 273, at 347; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1194. 
354 SeeJezer, et aI., supra note 273, at 347; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1194. 
This source of funding would only be available to qualifYing challengers because incum-
bents' congressional salary would bar them from receiving this money. See Jezer, et aI., 
supra note 273, at 347. 
355 See Lieberman, supra note 250, at 463. The author describes reform like closing the 
soft money loophole as being "incremental reform" as opposed to "comprehensive re-
form," which seems to be described as "radically recast[ing] our entire campaign finance 
system." Id. at 462-63. 
356 See Constitutional Implications of CampailfTl Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 197; 
Dreyfuss, Reform Gets Rolling, supra note 286, at 39 (noting that a "disparate coalition" in-
cluding women's groups and civil rights organizations among other groups were targeting 
states for clean money campaigns); Klein, Clean Elections Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra 
note 285, atAl; Malcolm, supra note 172, atA23. 
357 Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 317-22; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 
1189-1202; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 117, at 1149-54. 
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However, because politics will always trump ingenuity and good inten-
tions, it is more beneficial to look towards a full-funding plan that has 
engendered some support on Capitol Hill.358 Representative John F. 
Tierney (D-Mass.) has introduced a bill in the 107th Congress along 
with forty-nine co-sponsors that would establish clean elections for 
House candidates.359 The proposal, which borrows heavily from the 
Maine clean elections idea, requires a major party candidate in a pri-
mary election to declare herself a clean money candidate, promise 
not to run as a private money candidate in the general election, and 
collect 1500 qualifying contributions, defined as $5 exactly from regis-
tered voters from the candidate's state.360 The candidate then needs 
to turn over all qualifying contributions to the House of Representa-
tives Election Fund in exchange for public funding in the primary. 361 
A candidate qualifies as a general election clean candidate if the can-
didate satisfies certain requirements: The candidate (I) qualified dur-
ing the primary period; (2) filed a declaration attesting to having 
completed the requirements to be a clean elections candidate; (3) 
secured a written agreement with their party that the party will only 
spend a certain amount in connection with the candidate; (4) and the 
candidate's political party nominated the candidate to be placed on 
the ballot, or the candidate qualified as an independent to be placed 
on the ballot.362 
358 See H.R. 1637, lO7th Congo (2001); See Klarman, supra note 250, at 536-37; Collins, 
Campaign Finance 101, supra note 319, at A23; Cottle, supra note 319, at 20; Curran, supra 
note 3. 
!l59 See H.R. 1637, lO7th Congo (2001). Sen. Paul Wellstone, D-Minn., introduced a 
companion measure in the Senate on April 5, 2001 calling for full public funding of Sen-
ate elections. SeeS. 719, lO7th Cong. (2001). Because the bills are very similar and because 
Tierney has garnered forty-nine co-sponsors as opposed to Wellstone's two co-sponsors, 
Tierney's bill will be used as a model. See id.; S. 719, lO7th Congo (2001), BiU Summary & 
Status fur the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlO7:SN00719: 
@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 22, 2002); H.R. 1637, 107th Congo (2001), BiU Sum-
mary & Status fur the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlO7: 
HR0l637:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 22, 2002). 
360 H.R. 1637, 107th Congo §§ 501 (15), 502(a) (1)-(2), 505(a) (2001) (explaining that 
qualified candidates shall be certified no later than five days after a candidate files a decla-
ration). A "Major Party Candidate" is defined as "a candidate ofa political party of which a 
candidate for Member of or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress, for 
President, or for Governor in the preceding 5 years received, as a candidate of that party, 
25 percent or more of the total number of popular votes received in the State (or Congres-
sional district, if applicable) by all candidates for the same office." Id. § 501 (9). Qualifying 
contributions are defined as $5 exactly from registered voters from the candidate's state. 
See§ 501 (15). 
361Id. § 502(a) (2) (D). 
362Id. § 502(b). 
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A clean election candidate agrees not to accept private contribu-
tions after the qualifying period, not to expend funds other than 
those from their clean money funds, and not to expend personal 
funds. 363 In addition, clean election candidates can accept no more 
than $35,000 in seed money, defined as contributions from one per-
son that may be no more than $100 in the aggregate.364 This money 
can be used for campaign expenses (excluding television or radio ad-
vertising or personal use) from the date of the previous election 
through the earliest date clean election funds are made available.365 
Clean election money is distributed based on the applicable percent-
age of 80% of the base amount for each election cycle involved.366 
The base percentage is calculated using the national average of all 
amounts expended by winning candidates during the last three gen-
eral elections for House districts.367 In addition, the bill includes a 
provision to provide matching funds to a clean election candidate 
should a person make an independent expenditure against the clean 
election candidate or in favor of her private money opponent, or if 
the private money opponent should expend more than 125% of the 
amount of clean money provided.368 Finally, the bill includes several 
important provisions including a restructuring and strengthening of 
the weak FEC and free and reduced broadcast time for clean election 
candidates in the primary and general election.369 
On the whole, the bill includes a number of key components for 
a viable clean election proposal, including full funding and provisions 
for matching funds.37o Also, and perhaps more importantly, this pro-
363 [d. § 503. The bill does allow a candidate or a member of a candidate's immediate 
family to make a qualifYing contribution. [d. § 503(b) (2). 
S64 H.R. 1637, 107th Congo § 501 (16), § 504(a) (2001). 
363 [d. § 504(a) , (d), (g) (explaining that unspent seed money must be returned be-
fore clean election funds are made available for an election period); § 506 (b) (1)-(2) (ex-
plaining that money shall be made available on the later date of either when the candidate 
is certified or the date on which the primary election period begins for the primary, and 
forty-eight hours after certification of the primary results or the date in which a candidate 
is certified as a general election clean candidate, whichever comes first). 
!!66 [d. § 506(c). The "applicable percentage" is: "25 percent, in the case of a candidate 
in a primary election who is not a major party candidate; 40 percent, in the case of a major 
party candidate in a primary election; 60 percent, in the case of any candidate in a general 
election." [d. § 506(c) (3) (A) (i)-(iii). 
567 [d. § 506(c)(3)(B). 
368 [d. § 506(d). The bill limits matching funds to 200% of the clean money amount 
available. [d. § 506(e). 
369 H.R. 1637, 107th Congo §§ 301 (c), 302, 501-508 (2001). 
370 See generally id. 
2002] Campaign Finance Reform and Minority Candidates 159 
posal comes directly from a member of Congress who has found forty-
nine colleagues to co-sponsor this legislation in the 107th Congress.!l7l 
Despite its strengths, the proposal could be improved in a few 
ways, beginning with the inclusion of Senate races.372 Because of the 
severe deficiency of minorities and women in the Senate, any full 
funding proposal should encompass both the House and Senate.373 In 
addition, the bill currently requires all qualifying contributions to 
come from in-state registered voters; this provision should be altered 
to allow some out-of-state contributions, given that minority candi-
dates tend to collect a sizable amount of money from outside their 
districts and states.374 In addition, in calculating how much a clean 
election candidate should receive, the bill relies on a formula that 
calculates the national average of all amounts expending by the win-
ning candidates during the three most recent House elections.375 In 
order to tailor money to a specific area, a more effective approach 
would require an independent commission or the FEC to determine 
how much is appropriate for each House district or Senate race based 
on the peculiarities of that area.376 Finally, The Working Group on 
Electoral Democracy's idea of scholarship money for poor or working 
class candidates would truly make the electoral process more open to 
all kinds of potential candidates.377 
m See H.R 1637, 107th Congo (2001), Bill Summary & Status for thR 107th Congress, su-
pranote 359. 
572 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1190 (including House and Senate candi-
dates). Senator Wellstone's companion measure in the Senate calls for full public funding 
for Senate elections. S. 719, 107th Congo (2001). If it is easier procedurally to split up the 
bills, then it makes sense to do so; however, it is important to note that full public funding 
will not be full until both House and Senate candidates have the clean election option. See 
S. 719, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 1637, 107th Congo (2001). 
m SeeS. 719, 107th Congo (2001) (providing public funding for just the Senate); H.R. 
1637, 107th Congo § 502 (a) (2) (A) (2001) (requiring a major party candidate to collect 
1500 qualifYing contributions for House elections, but failing to provide a mechanism for 
Senate elections); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1190; Bositis, ThR Black Vote in 2000, 
supra note 13, at 3 (failing to list a single black member of the Senate in the 107th Con-
gress); Election 2000, supra note 28 (listing thirteen female senators in the 107th Congress). 
m See H.R 1637, 107th Congo § 501 (15) (B) (2001); ConstitutionalImplications of Ca'TTlr 
paign Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 197 (including an explanation from Raskin that 
"fhe reason why so many members of the Congressional Black Caucus raise their money 
out of state is because the people in their districts cannot afford to give them the huge 
sums of money that are required to run for public office"). 
S75 See H.R. 1637, 107th Congo § 506(c) (3) (B) (2001). 
576 See Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 318 (charging the FEC with setting the 
amount of public funding for candidates based on various aspects of the district or state). 
S77 SeeJezer, et aI., supra note 273, at 347; Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1194. 
The bill also bans soft money, limits independent and coordinated political party expendi-
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Tierney's bill is a beginning, a framework upon which to build.378 
One setback to any such proposal, in addition to the fact that incum-
bents would seek to block its passage, is the cost of such a proposa1.379 
Politicians are sensitive to cost, and such a large-scale proposal could 
be cost prohibitive, even during times of relative fiscal prosperity.380 
However, it is important to note that the cost for the average publicly 
funded campaign is less than the cost of the average campaign be-
cause candidates do not need to spend money trying to raise more 
money through direct mail and other methods, a large expense in any 
campaign.381 Aside from the cost, in order for real campaign finance 
reform to become a reality, reformers need to attract a ground swell 
of support to force drastic action.382 Until such support develops, poli-
tics will continue to delay real reform that would help increase the 
number of minorities and women in the United States Congress.383 
The most recent campaign finance legislation to pass a chamber of 
Congress, the McCain-Feingold bill, merely includes a study and re-
tures, and increases the aggregate individual contribution limit from $25,000 to $30,000 
among other things. See H.R. 1637, 107th Congo §§ 201-204, 401, 402 (2001). While these 
changes are not ideal, the strength of the public funding provisions makes the overall bill 
an excellent piece of campaign finance legislation with respect to female and minority 
candidates. See generally id. 
378 See also S. 719, 107th Congo (2001). See generally H.R. 1637, 107th Congo (2001). 
379 See Ford & Levien, supra note 269, at 320-21; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra 
note 117, at 1153. 
380 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1200. The authors estimated the cost of 
their full-funding proposal for House and Senate elections at $500 million per year, an 
estimate based on their calculations before their article's publication in 1994. Id. at 1200 
n.42; David E. Rosenbaum, Plan to Tie Tax Cut to Surplus Gains; G.O.P. Tries to Stop It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A16 (explaining that the Congressional Budget Office is projecting 
a $5.6 trillion budget surplus over the next ten years). 
381 See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 269, at 1189-90,1200-01. 
382 Campaign Finance Reform as a Civil Rights Issue, supra note 1, at 19 (including William 
McNary, co-director of Citizen Action/Illinois, who notes that clean election reform will 
take "a cataclysmic shift in power" that should be a movement including "labor, and 
churches, and rotary clubs, and women's groups, and people of color"); Clymer, Many 
Proposals, supra note 336, at 1; Dreyfuss, Reform Beyond the Beltway, supra note 286, at 50 
(noting that "reformers will have to assemble a lot of political muscle and millions of dol-
lars to back up their arguments .... Public financing may indeed be a bandwagon, but it 
will be some time before it shifts out of first gear. ") . 
383 See Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 197; 
Klarman, supra note 250, at 536-37; Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1400; Bositis, The Black Vote 
in 2000, supra note 13, at 3; Collins, Campaign Finance 101, supra note 319, at A23; Cottle, 
supra note 319, at 20; Curran, supra note 3; Election 2000, supra note 28; Klein, Clean Elec-
tions Act Alters Terrain in Maine, supra note 285, at AI; Malcolm, supra note 172, at A23. 
2002] Campaign Finance Reform and Minority Candidates 161 
port of clean elections; there is a long road to travel before actually 
enacting real reform, federal clean election legislation.384 
CONCLUSION 
Minorities and women have historically been under-represented 
in the United States Congress; although this situation has improved 
slightly, there is still a paucity of representation from these groups. 385 
Many politicians, or "reformers," claim to be peddling viable reform 
proposals that would improve the way campaigns are financed. 386 Too 
often, however, these "reformers" fail to take the concerns of chal-
lengers generally and the special concerns of minority and female 
candidates in particular, into account when crafting "reform. "387 
There are many proposals, including the McCain-Feingold bill that 
passed the Senate in 2001, cloaked in "reformer" clothing that would 
do little to promote diversity, or even worse, would endanger the lim-
ited progress women and minorities have achieved.388 The best ap-
proach for increasing the number of women and minorities in politics 
is to enact a clean election system similar to that of Maine, which in-
cludes full funding for House and Senate races.389 Short of that pro-
posal, legislators must at least take the special needs of minority and 
female candidates into account when enacting "reform," lest we might 
find ourselves wading through a sea of unintended consequences.390 
:184 SeeS. 17, 107th Congo § 312 (2001). The legislation calls for a study and report to 
be completed by the Comptroller General of the United States looking into the number of 
candidates and races impacted by clean election money and the effects of such money on 
candidates in Arizona and Maine. See id. 
:185 See Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 3; Election 2000, supra note 28. 
386 See S. 176, 107th Congo (2001); S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); S. 22, 107th Congo 
(2001); S. 17, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 1637, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 380, 107th Congo 
(2001); H.R. 151, 107th Congo (2001); S. 2941, 106th Congo (2000); H.R. 2866, 106th 
Congo (1999); H.R. 3068, 105th Congo (1997); Proposals at a Glance, supra note 4. 
:187 See HERRNSON, supra note 7, at 244; Overton, But Some Are More Equal, supra note 9, 
at 6-7. 
:188 See sources cited supra note 337, 340; Bositis, The Black Vote in 2000, supra note 13, at 
3; Election 2000, supra note 28; Hook & McManus, supra note 238, at AI. 
:189 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, §§ 1121-1128 (2000); Constitutional Implications of 
Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 250, at 197; Malcolm, supra note 172, at A23. 
390 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1390; Overton, But Some Are More Equal, supra note 9, 
at 6-7; Thomma, supra note 196 (explaining that McCain-Feingold could result in stronger 
political interest groups, reduced voter participation, and weakened political parties). 

